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1   Introduction
The vast majority of people in our country are law abiding 
and simply want to get on with their lives in a safe and 
secure environment. 
It is impossible to describe any aspect of prison in such 
a simplistic way. People end up ‘inside’ in many different 
circumstances relating to all sorts of crimes. Complex,  
sad and chaotic personal circumstances are not unusual. 
Some prisoners are individuals who simply need to be kept 
away from society. Others could be considered foolish or 
misguided and many vulnerable because of issues around 
mental health… identified and not. 
The complexity cannot be overestimated of running prisons 
and keeping everyone there safe, as well as trying to make  
it less likely that individuals will reoffend after release.  
The impact of success and the consequences of failure have 
a tangible effect on wider society and local communities. 
The work I have done on behalf of all four Police and Crime 
Commissioners representing five million people in the West 
Midlands region is to help understand better how prison 
impacts other parts of the criminal justice system and how 
other parts of criminal justice impacts prisons. 
This report is not a study about what causes criminality in 
society. Yes, of course, aspects of the work touch on what 
helps to reduce reoffending but at its heart, it is a detailed 
examination of the very practical challenges prisons in the 
West Midlands region face day-to-day.
Central to this has been understanding what things, big or 
small, easily done or not easily done, might help all agencies 
involved with criminal justice to work better together to 
tackle criminality in the prisons themselves. 
This work was kicked off with a meeting of more than  
forty professionals from all criminal justice agencies across 
the region. What developed at that first meeting was a  
wide-ranging discussion with the views from each agency 
feeding into the views of other agencies. 
The sense of determination and ‘joint endeavour’ was clear. 
However, what wasn’t clear was a sense that all agencies 
had a detailed enough understanding of the issues and the 
challenges faced by others. In short, agencies must try to 
achieve their own objectives but do so whilst also helping 
others in the wider system to achieve theirs. Doing that 
would result in a step change in the effectiveness of the 
whole criminal justice system for our society. The sense  
of understanding that was palpable. 
It motivated ongoing professional conversations as well as 
agreement by all to bring together the findings and provide 
a sense of what could change for the better. That work is 
ongoing and the report serves as a stimulant to do more, 
understand more and, importantly, understand more about 
the priorities and challenges in other parts of the same 
criminal justice system. 
As part of this work I visited most of the prisons across 
the West Midlands. I want to convey my gratitude to 
the Governors and Leadership Teams who hosted us so 
incredibly well. The visits were exhilarating, eye-opening 
and, at times, pretty depressing but speaking to so many 
professionals in their working environments was very 
helpful.
The strength of this report is that it doesn’t try to be strategic 
or tactical. It is the result of listening to professionals across 
criminal justice in order to provide a stimulant to think,  
and yes imagine, how things big and small, strategic and 
day-to-day might work better for whole system results.
Thank you to everyone who has played a part in this work 
and developing this report. 
Matthew Ellis  
(Staffordshire)
52   Overview
This report specifically considers the issue of ongoing criminality  
in prison custody. This research project was funded by the four PCCs  
in the Midlands’ region: Staffordshire, West Midlands, West Mercia  
and Warwickshire. However, the research has extended to consider  
the national context and policy agenda. The Government, and 
specifically Rory Stewart as Prisons Minister, has recognised that  
crime in prisons presents a pressing, significant, and contemporary 
challenge, and that is a point on which we concur. 
The nature and scale of ongoing criminality in prisons presents  
a challenge not only from a policing and prisons management and 
operational perspective, but to society more broadly. The police and 
criminal justice system seek to utilise prison as a disruption tool –  
to incapacitate offenders and to protect the community more widely. 
There is evidence that, at present, this function is being undermined. 
This report seeks to add empirical weight to the arguments about 
criminality in prison but also provides something of a starting point 
to consider how we can better create prison conditions that prevent 
and respond to crime in prisons when it occurs. It also looks at the 
phenomena of crime in prisons as it is understood by people in 
frontline agencies, police, prison staff and managers and prisoners 
themselves, as an attempt to begin to add more empirical evidence  
to debate. 
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Crime-free prisons are safer prisons. Yet, there is a common 
acceptance both within government and more broadly 
that, over the last five years, there has been a significant 
and noticeable decline in prison safety and security. In 
2015 and in his last annual report as Chief Inspector of 
Prisons, Nick Hardwick said, prisons were: “in their worst 
state for a decade” (HMIP, 2015). Similarly, the Justice Select 
Committee noted that there has been an: “ongoing and 
rapid deterioration in prison safety in England and Wales 
which began in 2012”, before adding: 
“The [Ministry of Justice] and NOMS have sought to 
improve prison safety through a wide range of legislative, 
operational and staff recruitment measures, including 
the creation of new offences of possession of new 
psychoactive substances and knife possession in prison 
and action to address violence through the use of body-
worn cameras and to improve safeguarding procedures. 
Notwithstanding these considerable efforts, together 
with those of staff in prisons striving to keep prisoners 
and themselves secure and unharmed, overall levels 
of safety in prisons have not stabilised as the Ministry 
hoped, let alone improved and continue to deteriorate 
significantly. We say that this is a matter of great 
concern, and improvement is urgently needed.”  
(Justice Committee, 2015: 4-5)
The current Chief Inspector of Prisons, Peter Clarke, has 
continued to note his concerns about declining safety and 
security and rising crime in prisons, stating that “the year 
2017–18 was a dramatic period in which [we] documented 
some of the most disturbing prison conditions we have 
ever seen – conditions which have no place in an advanced 
nation in the 21st century… violence, drugs, suicide and 
self-harm, squalor and poor access to education are again 
prominent themes” (HMIP, 2018). 
There were 22,374 prisoner-on-prisoner assaults in the  
12 months to March 2018 (a rate of 262 per 1,000 prisoners), 
up 16% from the previous year, and a new record high. 
The latest quarter (January 2018 – March 2018) saw 5,901 
incidents, an increase of 6% from the previous period.  
There were 9,003 assaults on staff in the 12 months to  
March 2018 (a rate of 106 per 1,000 prisoners), up 26%  
from the previous year. In the latest quarter, staff assaults 
increased by 4% to a new record high of 2,427 incidents,  
and while there has been a change in how staff assaults 
have been recorded (since April 2017, which may have 
increased the recording of incidents) the picture is one 
of alarming levels of violence in prisons at present. Such 
a decline in prison conditions sits alongside an increase 
in prison disorder and insecurity, including: high profile 
incidents at prisons such as those at HMP Birmingham, 
HMP The Mount and HMP Bedford; the fatal stabbing of 
an inmate at Pentonville (followed by a collapsed criminal 
trial); the murders of prisoners at HMP Woodhill and HMP 
Nottingham; and record finds of mobile phones, sim cards 
and drugs (MoJ, 2018). Without wishing to dwell too much 
on the negative issues of prison safety decline, prison safety 
today continues to be a concern, and understanding this is 
vital to understanding issues of criminality in prisons as the 
two are symbiotic. 
prisoner-on-prisoner assaults  
in the 12 months to March 2018
from the previous year 
and a new record high
up 16% 
16%
3   Prisons in Context
7There is some disagreement about whether the situation has 
recently emerged, or whether there has been a sustained 
deterioration in prison conditions over several years – a 
decline that has been most notably and recently highlighted 
when the Government announced it was taking back 
control of HMP Birmingham from private contractors G4S. 
While contemporary reports paint a picture of daily 
outbreaks of violence, cell fires and self-harm across the 
prison’s estate, the notion of prisons in crisis has existed 
since the Strangeways disturbance in 1990 and perhaps 
the principal reason for this is that of numbers. England 
and Wales saw a significant increase from almost 45,000 
prisoners in 1991, to 60,000 by 1997, and now some 85,000 
two decades later - an increase of nearly 90%. Numbers in 
prison remain stubbornly high and are predicted to rise yet 
further still in coming years until 2020. By way of contrast, 
in Scotland for example, with devolved justice and policing 
matters, there has been nothing like the same rise in the 
prison population. There the latest prison figures, at around 
7,200, is the lowest it has been for a decade. That fact 
should perhaps be borne in the forefront of our minds when 
calls to base the prison justice system on the Scottish model 
come to the fore (e.g. Howard League, 2018). 
While the prison population in England and Wales has 
risen, the Prison Service have faced substantial budgetary 
cuts. When the Coalition Government came to power in 
2010, it began its austerity efforts to reduce overall public 
expenditure. Eight years later, the budget for the then 
named National Offender Management Service (NOMS), 
which was responsible for prisons in England and Wales,  
was reduced by over a quarter. A key tactic in the 
efficiency drive for prisons has been a programme termed 
benchmarking, where publicly-run jails were required to peg 
their costs to the same level as the most efficient prisons, 
including those in the private sector. This programme 
included the Voluntary Early Departure (VEDs) scheme,  
a voluntary redundancy scheme for experienced staff.  
With the benchmarking programme and other cost-cutting, 
there was a dramatic reduction in staff numbers. The overall 
number of staff, employed across the public-sector prison 
estate in England and Wales has fallen from 45,000 in 2010 
to just 14,689 frontline officers (full-time equivalent) in 
England and Wales in June 2016.  
In the West Midlands, for example, there was a reduction of 
7% of staff in one year (Howard League). There is now a drive 
to recruit more prison staff as part of the most significant 
prison officer recruitment campaign for a generation, with  
a net increase of 3,111 prison officers between October 2016 
and March 20181. However, it remains the case that the 
Service has lost a significant number of experienced prison 
officers who are not easily replaced. In March 2010 there 
were about 25,000 operational staff in post. Just over 300  
of these, or 1.25%, had less than one year’s service. At the 
end of June 2018 here were about 21,600 operational staff 
in post. A decrease of 13%. However, some near 5,000 of 
these, or 22% had less than one year’s service experience.  
As former Chief Inspector of Prisons, Professor Nick 
Hardwick suggested to the Prison Governors association  
this year: 
A vicious circle has been created where reductions in the 
number of experienced staff beyond the level needed 
to maintain legitimate authority and order allowed the 
growth in the trade in drugs and that trade has now 
undermined efforts to restore authority. It is noteworthy 
that in Scotland, where officer number have not been 
reduced in the same way, Spice has arrived but not 
become overwhelming in the way it has in prisons only  
a few miles south… [in England and Wales]. The landscape 
has changed. Crime has changed, the prison population 
has changed and technological advances, the growing 
credibility of PCCs, the problems with probation all change 
the environment in which prisons have to operate.
The issue of criminality in prisons is now one that has begun 
to gain attention at a national level as a significant concern. 
In July 2018, the Government announced a £30 million 
prisons improvement package intended to tackle organised 
crime and restore buildings to a decent standard. The 
Government has expressed a desire to make prisons places 
of rehabilitation, but central to this task must be that they  
are places of safety, security and decency, as without that,  
it is unlikely that rehabilitative efforts will thrive. Prisons must 
be places of law and order: where the rule of law prevails, 
where there is proper, lawful authority, where staff are 
confident, and where criminality is targeted and challenged. 
1 See https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hmpps-workforce-prison-officer-recruitment-management-information-march-2018
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4    Why Prison Crime in  
the Midlands Matters 
The Midlands OPCC areas contain several prisons, HMPs 
Birmingham; Brinsford; Dovegate; Drake Hall; Featherstone; 
Hewell; Long Lartin; Stafford; Stoke Heath; Swinfen Hall  
and Werrington are all policed by Midlands area forces. 
However, arguably the burden of this is not distributed 
evenly. For example, West Midlands – the second largest 
force in England and Wales behind the Metropolitan  
Police and third-largest force in the United Kingdom –  
is responsible for policing HMP Birmingham. In contrast, 
Staffordshire, a far smaller force, is responsible for providing 
direct policing to an eclectic range of prison establishments:
  HMP Stafford - A male Category C sex offender treatment 
hub that can hold 751 prisoners.
  HMP Dovegate - A Category B training prison caring  
for over 1133 male adult prisoners over the age of 21,  
most serving a range of long-term sentences.
  HM YOI Werrington - 128 sentenced and remanded 
young people aged 15–18.
  HMP and YOI Stoke Heath - A closed Category C adult 
male and young adult with a capacity of 766.
  HMP and YOI Swinfen Hall - 622 YOIs serving four years  
to life/young adults (21–25), Cat Cs serving over four 
years.
 HMP Drake Hall - 340 females. 
Indeed, Staffordshire as a police area is responsible for 
providing policing to more prisons than any other national 
police service, a task made all the most difficult in a 
geographical location such as the Midlands which is  
also significant in terms of mapped, organised criminality 
(NCIS, 2018). The West Midlands alone has dozens of 
criminal gangs which are ‘significantly involved’ in the 
region’s drug trade, and the reach of these criminal groups 
extends UK wide, and has been cited as an early exemplar  
of ‘county lines’ (Coomber and Moyle, 2017). The Midlands  
is also significant in linking the UK’s traditional crime 
epicentre in London and the South East, with other large 
urban cities in the North and Wales. 
The Midlands region remains an important geographical hub 
for understanding mutating and shifting organised crime 
practices. While much organised crime is best understood 
as tied to specific regional localities, it is also increasingly 
symbiotically linked with the global (Wall, 2018). In its 2015 
organised crime report, the EU’s law enforcement agency, 
Europol, observed that the group structures that dominate 
fictional representations of organised crime seem to be 
disintegrating and are being replaced with loose networks 
made up of individual criminal entrepreneurs who interact 
and conduct their business in a shared, criminal underworld. 
These loose and undefined networks made up of criminal 
entrepreneurs and freelancers have little concern for group 
branding or loyalty. Their business model is increasingly 
digital, concealed by legitimate activity and is global in 
reach, but this does not negate the importance at a national 
level of the specifics of geography and local markets and 
opportunities (Wall, 2018). 
The West Midlands Regional Organised Crime Unit is a 
collaboration between the Police Forces of Staffordshire, 
West Midlands, West Mercia and Warwickshire to fight 
organised crime across the region and the WMROCU has 
led in many of the significant cases of prosecuting prison 
related crime having an impact and aiding the disruption 
of serious and organised crime within the region and 
beyond. The West Midlands Regional Prison Intelligence 
Unit has responsibility for ‘lifetime offender management’ 
within the region, maintaining a presence within the prison 
establishments covered by the WMROCU area. Prison 
Intelligence Officers have close links to their respective 
prison establishments, creating a strong working relationship 
which provides vital links with prison environments.
In the Midlands, the local protocol on organised crime  
in prison has been signed by Prison, CPS and police leads, 
and is beginning to come into effect and operation.  
9The purpose of this study was to explore the nature, 
prevalence and incidence of ongoing criminality in Prisons 
in four OPCC areas, and was guided from the outset by the 
following aims:
  Understand the scope and scale of continuing criminality 
in the prison estate across the four OPCC areas.
  Understand the current threat from ongoing criminality  
in prisons.
  Understand the harm caused by those in prison to our 
local communities.
  To develop systematic and realistic crime and harm 
reduction approaches.
The topic of ongoing criminality in prisons is under 
researched. There is no single literature that can set the 
scene, and hence, systematically gathering existing research 
findings together is a complex task. It is perhaps worth 
noting at the outset that the direct literature on the topic 
directly is not extensive (Gooch and Treadwell, 2015,  
Crewe, 2005).  
A range of academic texts, journal articles, and official 
reports contain some relevant material, but these can tend 
to cover a disparate range of subjects. It is also the case that 
much of the academic literature is dated and/or originates 
from the US. There is not a great deal that is known about 
continuing criminality in prison, its nature, character and 
drivers. Indeed, it is best considered a very embryonic 
subject.
The literature review for this project was first compiled by 
systematic searches of core official and academic literature 
on crime in prison, setting out what is currently known. 
However, it rapidly becomes apparent that there is very little 
empirical work that deals with ongoing criminality in prisons, 
or which draws on the experience of prisoners and prison 
staff, law enforcement personnel or the wider criminal 
justice system employees. For that reason, we have taken  
a qualitative approach to data gathering and have spoken  
to these groups directly to add some empirical evidence  
to current discussions. 
5   Methodology
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This report is based on a collaborative, ongoing mixed-
methods research including single site studies on topics 
of violence and criminality in prison across several 
establishments of differing security categories, which 
include: YOIs, Category B Local Prisons and Category C 
Prisons in the OPCC region and beyond. It blends surveys, 
interviews, focus groups and participant observation with  
an analysis of institutional data in a manner reminiscent of 
what is termed ‘appreciative inquiry’ (Leibling, et al, 1999).  
It also includes countless informal conversations with staff 
and prisoners both before and during the research period. 
With informed consent, interviews were digitally recorded 
and subsequently transcribed. No identifiers have been 
used for participants, and given the sensitivity of the 
topic, prisoners were on occasion keener to speak to 
us in person, but off tape, in areas of the prisons where 
they felt comfortable. A similar approach has been taken 
with criminal justice staff, many of whom were keener to 
speak candidly one-to-one than by formally recorded in 
interviews. In accordance with assurances given at the time, 
we have not named or identified individuals in the report 
and have censored details or specifics which might allow 
for the identification of individuals. Prisoner interviews have 
been critical to understanding the problem of ongoing 
criminality in prisons, enabling us to achieve a much 
deeper and richer understanding of the rationale, nature 
and dynamics of ongoing criminality. The interviews we 
have undertaken in prisons, coupled with an archive of well 
over 300 prisoners in custody in various establishments in 
England and Wales since 2013 on topics related to ongoing 
criminality (and topics such as violence, violence reduction, 
the illicit economy) have also helped us to understand how 
hierarchies, networks and groups are formed within the 
prison, and how this might replicate or mirror gang and 
group structures within the community. We have organised 
interviews and focus groups with policy makers and 
stakeholders to garner a range of views and opinions and 
guide our understanding. 
As part of wider research projects since 2013, the authors 
have observed different aspects of prison life in different 
parts of the prison. We visited at different times of the day 
and week, including evenings and weekends. We spent time 
on each of the residential units, segregation, in education 
and workplaces, in gyms and on reception. Taken together 
this allowed us to observe specific activities for prisoners 
such as association, meal times, cell searches, canteen 
distribution as well as the general ‘ebb and flow’ of daily 
prison life. This embedded ‘appreciative’ approach (Liebling 
et al, 1999) has not only given us an incredibly rich and 
detailed insight into ongoing criminality within the prison, 
but it has also uniquely placed us to develop a series of 
recommendations regarding the prevention, management 
and response to issues of criminality in prison.
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The Criminal Law continues to apply in prison settings.  
Thus, offences that occur in the community – such as 
murder, manslaughter, rape, sexual assault, wounding/
assault occasioning grievous bodily harm, assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault, theft, 
robbery – can also occur in prison. There are, however, a 
range of offences that are specific to the prison environment 
and may also constitute a criminal offence. For example, 
1. The possession of psychoactive substances
2. Being in possession of a mobile telephone
3. Being in possession of tobacco 
4.  Conveyance of prohibited items into a prison or young 
offender institution 
In addition, The Prison Act 1952 (“the Prison Act”) and the 
updated Prison Rules 1999 (“the Prison Rules”) or Young 
Offender Institution Rules (“the YOI Rules”) set out 29 
prison specific offences capable of punishment, including: 
disobeying lawful orders, failing a mandatory drug test or 
having an unauthorised item, such as a mobile phone.
Prisoners who commit crimes in prison can face two 
judicial and pseudo-judicial processes. If deemed 
sufficiently serious, as detailed in the ‘Handling Crime in 
Prison’ protocol, criminal offences committed in prison 
can be referred by prison authorities to the police, formally 
investigated, and referred to the Crown Prosecution Service 
for possible charge(s) and prosecuted. If such prosecutions 
are successful, this can lead to serving prisoners being 
formally convicted and facing an additional sentence(s). 
For less serious matters, those prisoners who break 
the prison rules can be brought before a prison-based 
disciplinary hearing called an ‘adjudication’. Most 
adjudication cases are tried by a governor and, except in 
very limited circumstances, there is no right to legal aid 
to assistance with the costs of legal representation. Thus, 
this unique disciplinary system runs alongside the formal 
mechanisms of the criminal justice process. 
While crime in prison is similar to forms of crime in the 
community, there are also some significant differences. 
Aspects of the sub-rosa economy could represent an 
extension of illegal business activities in the community. 
Entrepreneurially minded prisoners exploit opportunities 
to make vast sums of money, and while we need to be 
careful at taking such claims at face value, there are clearly 
prisoners who make substantial amounts of money in 
prison. Thus, the problems created by the entrepreneurial, 
instrumental and criminal drug dealing culture extend 
beyond the obvious harms associated with simply finding 
someone in possession of contraband. There is more at 
stake than simply being in possession of a mobile telephone 
or quantity of drugs. 
The trade in contraband means that vulnerable people  
are coerced into committing additional criminality in prison 
due to debt, or the failure to pay often leads to physical 
violence. The use of violence, threats and intimidation 
to settle disputes, punish ‘grassing’ (informing), and seek 
redress in cases where indebted individuals fail to make 
repayments or come good on promises also destabilises 
prison regimes. This violence has a toxic and corrosive 
impact on institutional culture and negatively impacts on 
prisoners’ perception of safety. It can also overspill into 
the community and lead to ongoing crime and post-
prison conflict, and there is ample evidence that both are 
happening at present. 
6   Defining Crime in Prison
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The Illicit Economy
Prisoners derive status from the acquisition of material 
goods. However, prison life can be ‘depriving… in the 
extreme’ (Sykes, 1958: 63) and the availability of desired 
items is heavily restricted. This serves to increase, rather 
than decrease, the importance of acquiring the available 
resources. Of course, when a body of prisoners live near 
one another in a tense and hostile environment physical 
confrontation and violence can manifest itself, and 
physical violence in prison and other prison-based crimes 
clearly do not always have an exploitative or acquisitive 
dimension (cf. Edgar et al, 2003). In addition, different 
issues may be faced by different types of prison (public/
private, categories and male/female or young offenders) and 
different types of prisoner. It is therefore important that we 
do not simplistically equate crime in prison as a universal 
and fixed experience as it may differ substantially in terms 
of motive, severity, and impact. However, what we ought 
to understand is that a desire to acquire power, status, 
distinction and possessions does not end when an offender 
enters prisons, as conversations with prisoners reveal: 
“If you saw my cell now… I’ve got my Versace pillows, 
I’ve got my fluffy wall, I’ve got my lamps, I’ve got my 
rugs… some of it you get handed in, I’ve got my sick 
bedding, I’ve got my memory foam pillow, I’ve got my 
Versace clothes. I’ve got my Armani flip-flops. I’ve got 
my comforts; do you know what I mean? I make it look 
homely. I’ve got pictures up and stuff. These things – I’ve 
got plants, I’ve got flowers, I’ll have to show you – these 
things, these belongings of mine put my personality in 
there.” (Prisoner, Cat C)
While prisons can be a secure environment, and 
commodities can be scarce, prisons can also be a lucrative 
marketplace (Gooch and Treadwell, 2015). In prison, the 
illicit economy is one that is often based on hedonistic and 
consumerist patterns of consumption and is organised at 
the most profitable end around prohibited items (Crewe, 
2005). Both legal and illicit commodities are traded, and this 
forms the backdrop to much of the day-to-day activity in 
custodial settings:
“Obviously… the main thing is obviously lending, 
borrowing, the whole buying and selling of whatever it 
may be. You could go from Burn to Mamba to not so 
much any other drugs really… you know what I mean, 
but it’s more Mamba and Burn over the time I’ve been 
here that, you know, guys are lending, borrowing and 
swapping, or mobile phones.” (Prisoner, Cat B)
There is clearly a significant demand for narcotics in prison. 
More than two in five prisoners surveyed by the Centre for 
Social Justice in England and Wales reported committing 
offences to acquire money to buy drugs (Centre for Social 
Justice, 2015). That demand for drugs does not stop in 
prison custody and, put simply, in most prisons drug use 
is endemic. Ignoring new psychoactive substances, 10.6% 
of random mandatory drug tests conducted on prisoners 
in 2017/18 were positive, up 1.3% on the previous year. 
This is the highest level since the year ending March 2006. 
However, when new psychoactive substances (NPS) are 
tested for, the rate is 20.4% (MoJ, 2018) suggesting that 
criminalisation has had little long-term impact on stemming 
the flow of these substances into prisons, a fact that 
prisoners themselves attested to: 
“Right, I will put it this simple, it [drug dealing] puts food 
on a lot of lads’ tables out there and in here, you get me, 
we need to keep earning, and there are ways to do that. 
Big money, as much money as can be earned on the 
out, on road. Lads will do what they have to do on the 
outside, you get me, and they will do what they have to 
do on the inside too. Now obviously, I am not going to 
just say “I do this” and “I do that” to you, but you know 
what I did outside, do you think I am going to stop in  
here for the offer of £8 a week as a wing cleaner?” 
(Prisoner, Cat B)
Drug supply was ‘big business’, particularly in the Category 
B and Category C estate. There is of course difference 
across the prison estate (see below), but it is clear to us that 
for entrepreneurially-minded individuals, the profits were 
lucrative and such individuals were often tempted to simply 
continue their criminal behaviour inside.
7    The Scale and Nature  
of the Problem
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Drugs
Drug misuse is a serious threat to the security of the prison 
system, the health of individual prisoners and the safety 
of prisoners and staff. Illicit items, narcotics, tobacco, 
alcohol, weapons and mobile phones have a significantly 
high monetary value as part of the sub-rosa economy in 
prison custody, and trade in illicit items and narcotics have 
effects that ripple outwards to harm prisoners’ friends 
and families and the wider community of which they are 
a part. An increasing number of reports of the misuse of 
drugs in prison have been linked with the crisis in prison 
safety and security, and particularly some have come to 
argue that the availability of new psychoactive substances 
(NPS), particularly synthetic cannabis known as ‘Spice’ 
or ‘Mamba’, highly prevalent since 2012, and which are 
regarded by some commentators as a ‘game-changer’ have 
furthered impacted on the significant reduction in prison 
safety. A thematic report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons on 
‘Changing patterns of substance misuse in adult prisons and 
service responses’ noted that ‘NPS have created significant 
additional harm and are now the most serious threat 
to the safety and security of the prison system that our 
inspections identify’ (HMPS, 2015: 7). However, it has long 
been suggested by prisoners that involvement in prison drug 
markets significantly increase the likelihood of victimisation 
and there is evidence that violence played a part in drug 
dealing in custodial settings before the arrival of NPS  
(Crewe, 2009). 
“You can say that in here, well, life is mainly about drugs. 
For a lot of the lads in here, it gives them a purpose to 
their day, scratching about to get themselves something, 
looking forward to it, it structures their life and gives 
them a meaning. For a few in here, it funds their life 
basically.” (Prisoner, Category C)
“We can dress it up, but a lot of what happens is just the 
drug market in prison. We had this case, the lad involved, 
he named several prisoners he was having problems with 
and said, they are taking me nan’s pension, I owe them 
2 grand, but he only told us about it when he came back 
in. On his day of release, these two lads, heavy lads; they 
met him at the gate because he had run up a massive 
debt. They took his £46 discharge grant for petrol and 
drove him to his nan’s house. Then they intimidated his 
nan, basically, they made her clear this lad’s debt. They 
made her hand over £400 that she had in her house, 
her savings, but that wasn’t enough, so they bundled 
this lad and his nan into the car and then took her to the 
cash point to draw out the last £200 he owed, all this 
happened because of drugs he used in prison. We can’t 
keep them [prisoners] safe from it in prison anymore.” 
(Prison Officer)
There have always been hierarchies in prison, and those 
were traditionally perhaps organised around status and 
offence, rather than the intricacies of the drug market and 
who plays a ‘leading role’ in it. The drug trade in prison acts 
to structure hierarchies, and in prison it is a source of power 
and influence for some prisoners to exert over others. 
Both in prison and the community the upper echelons of 
the criminal fraternity are now dominated by a notable 
concentration of Serious Organised Crime (SOC) offenders 
who are in prison because of drug trafficking and other 
related offences such as the use of firearms, violence, and 
money laundering (Hobbs, 2013). Our research suggests that 
such offenders, irrespective of where they are in the prison 
estate, are the more capable, more organised individuals 
with extensive supportive networks on the outside. They 
more usually take a more calculated and business focused 
approach to their activities, both within prison and whilst 
on licence, and ‘exercise pragmatism in their dealings 
with authority to minimise the disruptive influence of law 
enforcement on their illicit enterprises’ (e.g. see NCA, 2018, 
Gooch and Treadwell, forthcoming). These prisoners supply 
a demand that is widespread, and seek to profit from it, and 
increasingly, these organised criminals seem to be regarding 
prison wings as a lucrative marketplace. 
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Organised Crime Moving Inside
OCGs (of which there were 4,629 mapped in the UK at 
the end of 2017) … work together in criminal enterprises. 
New market entrants will integrate with existing criminal 
infrastructure such as money laundering networks and 
logistics providers to enable them to expand their activities 
and even distance themselves from the criminality. 
Additionally, strong ties exist between some SOC offenders 
through common criminal interest or affiliations formed in 
the prison environment. (National Crime Agency, 2018: 8) 
Whilst what constitutes ‘organised crime’ is on one level 
simple, and many believe they ‘know it when they see it’, 
it is an ambiguous concept (Hobbs, 2013). Since the year 
2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime has provided an internationally shared 
definition of an organised criminal group as ‘a group of three 
or more persons existing over a period acting in concert 
with the aim of committing crimes for financial or material 
benefit’. However, with all definitions there are problems 
adequately describing the complex and flexible nature of 
modern organised crime networks, which often operate 
in a criminal economy dictated by the laws of supply and 
demand and are favoured by social tolerance for certain 
types of crime, and rapidly shifting opportunities. (Wall, 2018)
Several factors have changed the opportunities for 
organised crime in prison. Prisons can be monotonous and 
dull, creating a large demand for drugs. Drugs are the main 
commodity in the global organised crime business (Hobbs, 
2013), but are also at the epicentre of some prisoner’s 
involvement in the economy in custody (Crewe, 2005). 
However, the security and regulation mean that trafficking 
drugs into prison is arguably more challenging than 
community supply. Other changes, such as the prohibition 
on smoking in all prisons, can also drive and develop new 
lucrative markets because organised crime generally thrives 
when there are market prohibitions, yet demand remains. 
(Hobbs, 2013) 
The National Crime Agency suggest that the threats from 
Serious Organised Crime (SOC) offenders when incarcerated 
in prison can be split into two distinct types: those who 
continue to facilitate SOC in the community from within the 
prison walls; and those who are involved in organised crime 
within the prison environment. While this categorisation is 
one that is neat and initially logical, there may necessarily be 
some degree of overlap between these categories, as the 
NCA note more generally (as do an array of criminological 
commentators) that financial imperatives and opportunity 
tend to be the main drivers of serious criminality. 
Some of the symptoms of organised crime in prison lie 
in the increased number of mobile phones found and 
the epidemic of illicit drugs. Figures vary on the number 
of phones found in prison annually, but HMPPS Annual 
Digest 2017/18 suggests that there were increases of 15% 
and 13% of mobile phones and SIM cards found in prison, 
respectively, between the year ending March 2017, meaning 
in real terms there were 10,643 incidents where mobile 
phones were found in prisons and 4,729 incidents where 
SIM cards were found (and yet, what is found may be the 
tip of the iceberg) (MoJ, 2018). Almost every prisoner in the 
country can have access to a mobile phone, and there is a 
lucrative trade on the inside. Prisoners are threatened into 
holding phones for others, some will rent or hire handsets 
short-term for payment, and there is even a market for 
smaller and less detectable phones that are manufactured 
specifically for their concealability and ability to beat prison 
detection systems. This includes the world’s smallest 
phone - the L8Star BM70 which is less than three inches 
long and smaller than a disposable lighter, retailing outside 
for between £20 and £50. Of course, mobile phones are 
not subject to the monitoring and restrictions unlike pin 
coded prison phones. Additionally, the current generation 
of mobile phones can facilitate access to the internet, 
generating additional problems such as witness intimidation, 
maintaining links with criminal contacts, and simply 
continuing to run nefarious activities back in the community 
(sometimes unrelated to prison disputes). Corrupt prison 
officers, auxiliary staff and civilian workers assist organised 
criminals by smuggling illicit items into the prison and by 
providing information to key members of prison-based 
crime groups. 
The smuggling of mobile phones and sim cards into prisons 
allows SOC offenders to continue their operations from the 
inside. Illegal drug supply within prisons is highly lucrative for 
suppliers, but extremely detrimental to the prison population 
and expensive for the state. Intelligence suggests that 
the prison drug trade has largely moved away from being 
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largely based around heroin (Crewe, 2005) to one where 
New Psychoactive Substances, and other former NPS drugs 
such as cathinones, ‘Monkey dust’ or MDPV a powder drug, 
are also becoming more commonplace. These are easily 
sourced outside prison at relatively low cost but become 
increasingly valuable when conveyed into the prison.
Spice is one of several new formerly legally available drugs 
which are synthetic compounds that can cause people 
to experience enhanced sensations and, in some cases, 
extremely damaging health side-effects or extreme erratic 
behaviour. It is commonly associated with increased mental 
health issues, and there is emerging evidence regarding 
its addictive properties. Because these new PSs are now 
available in liquid form which can be sprayed onto paper 
and ingested or injected, it makes it more difficult to detect 
when being trafficked into prisons, including through 
the postal system. While it is largely used in prison and is 
described as odourless, when smoked the burning smell 
is detectable. While some perceived that prisons going 
smoke-free and changes in the legal status of PS and their 
criminalisation in legislation would deter use in prison, 
believing that their popularity was linked to its ability to beat 
prison Mandatory Drug Testing (MDT) this does not seem 
to have materialised in any meaningful way (User Voice, 
2016). After the prison smoking ban in England and Wales, 
prisoners have found ways to use PS via adapted e-cigarette 
vapes. A fifth of all MDT prisoners return positive tests 
suggesting that the market now established in prison is not 
declining despite recent legislative changes and increased 
prohibitions (MoJ, 2018). 
“I would say in terms of our understanding, well the 
prison service is a long way behind, we need to shine 
a light into some dark corners and expose some pretty 
uncomfortable truths about where the organisation 
has not had enough sight really, we simply have not 
had enough understanding, but to me, it seems pretty 
apparent that we have a pretty substantial organised 
crime problem in some of our prisons, and we have not 
even begun to consider how it will evolve in the future.” 
(HMPPS Staff)
“I would say that we, the police, we are a bit more 
evolved in terms of our understanding, and there is 
certainly more to do and more that we would like to be 
doing. Resources are tight for everyone at the moment, 
and that is creating a lot of pressure, and some things, 
it’s just about giving systems time to bed in, but I would 
say that really, we are a lot further along in terms of 
understanding the organised problem than our prison 
counterparts at the moment.” (Police Manager)
Clearly not all crime in prison involves drugs, and 
some offences will originate from within the custodial 
environment because of a conflict or an opportunity 
emanating from the environment itself. Violent and criminal 
men will often find themselves in prison custody (Ellis et 
al, 2018, Ellis, 2016) and many of these have established 
reputations for violence in the community. While a majority 
of prisoners may serve to avoid disciplinary sanctions in 
prison, other prisoners will actively seek out opportunities 
to commit offences and act to exploit situations they 
find themselves in. As Van der Laan (2012:135) states, at 
first glance, prison would seem to be a prime example 
of a location with strict supervision, where offenders are 
physically separated from any potential targets by virtue 
of the prison walls. However, the reality is that prisons 
are places where some individuals continue to offend 
and where organised crime can be initiated and become 
embedded in the very routine activities of prison life. Indeed, 
organised crime activity within prison settings has widely 
been reported in the media and has, on occasion, been the 
subject of policy and academic study. For example, in the 
USA, the Presidents Commission on Organized Crime (1984) 
noted the potential role of prisons as places of organised 
crime activity and more recently in the UK, the National 
Strategic Assessment of Serious and organised crime 
(2017) makes similar observations of the manipulation and 
conditioning of staff and other prisoners being a key enabler 
for SOC nominal offenders. 
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Criminal Finances in Prison
Prison is notionally a cash-free society, although that is 
not always the case. Prisoners have suggested that money 
can still exist in prison and can be used to make purchases, 
but holding money is risky in so far as it can be found 
and confiscated, and lead to the risk of added sanction. 
In contrast, management of finances in prison for illicit 
items is often handled by bank accounts or the banks 
accounts of friends, family and associates, with transactions 
managed by third parties. Hence criminal abuse of finances 
by prisoners and their associates primarily takes the form 
of the exploitation of weaknesses in the prison and of the 
banking system, and by using friends and families’ bank 
accounts either with or without their consent, again made 
more possible with the increased use of mobile phones 
and transactions that occur beyond the scrutiny of prison 
officers. Additionally, the use of third and fourth generation 
internet-enabled mobile phones allows for internet 
banking outside, conference with parties outside the prison 
walls, and the use of social media. It can also open the 
possibility of prisoners exploiting and using new payment 
methods such as PayPal accounts, and even the use of new 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
“…by postal order it’s like they can check the accounts 
and what area it’s been sent from so like I sort of, I like 
doing it through banks.” (Prisoner, YOI)
“…we have found it very hard to follow the money, it 
goes everywhere, all over the place, through this bank 
account and then that, that is what we have seen when 
we have been given access, we, the prison service do 
not have the knowhow to understand it. Good analysts 
in financial investigation can, the police for example 
might, but at the moment we do not have that capacity, 
we cannot tell where the money goes, how much or 
how far. We know it is a lot, but we do not have the 
ability to understand it properly.” (Prison Manager)
Transformations in banking and finance and the move 
away from cash as currency more generally means that 
understanding how prison profits are moved is limited. 
However, offenders generally, including interviewed SOC 
offenders in prison custody, suggest that a prison business 
model has developed whereby items such as drugs 
(including PS), mobile phones, sim cards, alcohol, weapons 
and tobacco/associated paraphernalia are purchased with 
the sole intent of smuggling them into prisons, where the 
market value can be at least five to ten times higher, and 
where there are high profits to be made. Additionally, the 
mark-up in prices in prison is further compounded when 
individuals do not manage their debts or make payments 
in a timely fashion. In such cases, prisoners owing smaller 
amounts of money may find themselves liable for tens 
of thousands of pounds of debt through punitive interest 
rates levied by lenders in prison. It appears to us through 
interviews with prisoners that this is not unusual, but has 
become a common and accepted part of much prison life:
“I’ve had to quadruple people’s debts before. […] Half 
of the kids on this wing can’t come out for their dinner 
because as soon as they step out of their door it’s game 
over. The officers have to get their food for them, they 
can’t even have showers. That’s going on right now 
on this wing. I can name off more than five people, no 
hope. It goes on every single wing in this prison…. The 
satisfaction of knowing that I’m keeping them behind 
their door, stopping them from getting their own meals. 
The satisfaction of me knowing that […] is so much 
better for me.” (Prisoner, YOI)
In some cases, the very exploitative levying of ‘pad debts’ 
(where a cell mates’ debt is levied on a prisoner who did 
not take on that debt) blurs the lines between lending and 
what is in effect simply naked, predatory extortion and 
victimisation (Gooch and Treadwell, 2015). 
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“If I have a next-door neighbour and he comes in here 
and I clock on that he’s a XXXX and he’s not about this 
at all, every time I hear his kettle flick on, he’s got to pay 
me. It’s that simple. Every time I go past and your lights 
on, you’ve got to give me something. You got to pay 
your rent.” (Prisoner, YOI) 
“I remember, in one case, this lad, he came in, he was 
not like the other prisoners, more a straight going guy 
that had gone wrong. By the end, the prisoners, after he 
left, they told me that they had rinsed him, some of the 
other more serious characters basically, when he got 
out, on the outside ended up having to sign over his top 
of the range Mercedes over to them, basically they just 
took it from him.” (Prison Officer) 
In either case, some individuals in prison, whether by act or 
omission can be subject to extortion or exploitation. There 
are numerous incidents of this moving from the prisoner, 
to attempts at extortion of family members through threats 
and actual violence against them or the indebted offender. 
Additionally, debts for some prisoners can see them become 
part of the prison drug trade, as it is possible to repay debts 
by getting deliberately recalled while smuggling drugs into 
the prison. 
Short-term Imprisonment
In June 2018, prisoners serving six months or less accounted 
for just over 4% of the prison population, and this is a very 
small number of the overall population, and yet, arguably, 
short sentence prisoners are undoubtedly a challenge for 
prisons. A short prison sentence is any sentence of less than 
12 months, and this group make up a significant proportion 
of some prison’s population. Many short sentence prisoners, 
particularly revolving door prisoners, have a multitude of 
problems, including homelessness, drug addiction and poor 
family relationships. For others short prison sentences can 
have a very damaging impact on prisoners’ lives, especially 
as such sentences mean the loss of jobs, homes, and family 
breakdowns. Short sentences offer very little opportunity to 
offer practical interventions that might reduce the risks of  
the prisoner re-offending.
While in prison, the short time available often means there 
is little opportunity to adequately address the needs of this 
population, with limited access to support and interventions, 
education and work. Short-term prisoners are also often the 
most chaotic and difficult individuals in the prison estate. 
In 2009 a motion was passed by the Prison Governors 
Association (PGA) to abolish prison sentences of 12 months 
and under on the basis that they do not work. Since then, 
several other key stakeholders have also expressed concern 
about the ineffectiveness of short prison sentences. While 
women are disproportionately sent to prison for non-violent 
crime and on short sentences, it has been suggested that 
In England and Wales, we overuse prison for petty and 
persistent crime (Prison Reform Trust, 2017). Of the 66,000 
people sent to prison in 2016/17 71% have committed a 
non-violent offence and 47% were sentenced to six months 
or less. The MoJ themselves acknowledge that ‘Custodial 
sentences of under 12 months… are associated with 
higher levels of reoffending than sentences served in the 
community via ‘court orders’ (MoJ 2018). This has driven 
reform and greater support given to short sentence released 
prisoners. When such individuals are released from prison, 
they now receive support and supervision from a privately-
operated Community Rehabilitation Company. If they 
do not comply or ‘breach’ these conditions, they can be 
recalled back to prison to serve more time in prison custody.
Over the course of the last 20 years, the number of 
people in prison due to recall has increased substantially. 
In June 1995, on any given day, about 150 people were 
in prison because they had been recalled. By June 2016, 
this number had grown to 6,600. In the 12 months to the 
end of September 2016, 22,094 people were recalled to 
prison. There is evidence that the changes in supervision 
requirements of short sentence prisoners is achieving little 
change. The number of people recalled to prison has been 
growing for two decades, but changes in recent years 
(particularly around extending licences to those on custodial 
sentences of less than 12 months) have caused the rate 
of prison recall to accelerate. People released from short 
sentences were made eligible for recall for the first time in 
a move to enable the privatisation of the probation service 
and the use of CRCs.  
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There is evidence that this has inadvertently driven the 
disorder and drug markets in our jails, which as we 
have noted, is more frequently (though not exclusively) 
encountered in Category B and C establishments with a 
high churn and turnover of prisons, and particularly in urban 
prisons in, or in close proximity to, large cities. 
There are different types of recall to prison. All short-term 
prisoners will face fixed-term recall (of no more than 14 
days as their original prison sentence is under 12 months). 
Most recalls to prison are for technical breaches of licence 
conditions, not the commission of new crimes. In the 12 
months ending September 2016, 7,798 people were recalled 
back to prison for ‘failing to keep in touch’ and a further 
5,228 were sent back for ‘failing to reside’ at a given address. 
A point ought to be made that this presence and reception 
of short-term prisoners is likely a factor that impacts 
disproportionately on some parts of the prison estate, and 
particularly the category B and C prisons seeing the worst 
excesses of increasing violence, drug debt and instability. 
However, the issue of short sentence prisoners and their part 
in the current situation has received far less attention than 
prison staffing levels. Additionally, that very churn of short 
prisoners may contribute to the flow of drugs in prison, and 
hence the general instability encountered in some prison 
regimes. We were certainly told by a number of prisoners 
that those conveying drugs into establishments were often 
short-term prisoners who were induced, or intimidated, into 
conveying drugs and mobile phones into prison by plugging 
items in their rectum, or ‘swallowing’ items and conveying 
them in the stomach internally. The Government have 
recognised this as a problem and moved to act on acquiring 
body scanners to detect when this happens in Path Finder 
prisons, but these prisoners still have to be received into 
custody, and even from segregated status can manage to 
move prohibited items conveyed inside into the mainstream 
prison population. While the Government’s current initiative 
might be useful in driving down the levels of drug availability 
in custody, it seems realistic to suggest that such methods 
of importation may remain problematic, and at present it 
would seem that for many local prisons this is a route of 
supply:
“You have mules bringing stuff in, basically when you 
look at who it is, you have to be suspicious of short 
sentence prisoners on fixed recalls. It isn’t always the 
case, but a lot of the time they are part of the business 
model, they are smuggling, in their bodies, a couple of 
Kinder Eggs packed with gear and you are talking about 
a lot of money, and the only real cost to them is going 
out and then coming back for some 7-14 days.”  
(Prison Manager)
“One case recently, the lad came back in on a recall, 
went back handed himself over for a stupid offence.  
I smashed a shop window, it was me, lock me up sort 
of thing, he knew he was going back for less than 
14 days. It makes you think, what is behind that, you 
have suspicions, but it’s proving them, and if there is 
something hidden, it’s finding it.” (Prison Officer)
“It is not that all of these recalls are earning money, if 
you look at who is getting recalled, they are muppets, 
sad cases, debtors, they are being put up to it. They are 
the well, the useless and hopeless sorts, they are not 
the ones making any money off of it, they are paying 
back the debts they have been driven into. It’s a business 
model, they come back in to pay their debts.”  
(Prisoner, Cat C)
In 2015, the Centre for Social Justice recommended 
that ‘the MoJ should review their decision on body 
scanners. Evidence from the USA suggests they could 
be a game-changer in the fight against drug smuggling. 
We recommend that the MoJ rolls out the use of body 
scanners for all prisons in England and Wales’ (CSJ 2015: 
46). It has recently been suggested that the test introduction 
of body scanners into several test site prisons has yielded 
some significant reductions in availability of drugs in these 
establishments. However, recognising the role short-term 
prisoners play as conveyers particularly exploiting the policy 
of being deliberately recalled to prison is useful. 
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Drugs in Prison
We know that there is a significant demand for drugs in 
prison, and it is likely that unfulfilling regimes and more 
prisoners spending more time in their cells fuels this 
demand. Drugs in prison are frequently described as ‘bird 
killers’ or ‘bar melters’ because the sought pharmacological 
effect is frequently that of making time pass. However, the 
issue of drugs in prison is largely under researched and 
poorly understood. There is little data that breaks down 
the types of drugs being seized or gives detailed additional 
information allowing for better analysis of the problems of 
drugs in prison. The little research that does exist tends to 
suggest that drugs (and alcohol and tobacco) are illegally 
conveyed into prison, or, in some instances involves the 
diversion of medication to those not authorised to have it. 
 Visits (both social and legal)
  Exploitation of postage systems (both legal and ordinary 
mail)
 Corrupt staff (prison and auxiliary)
 Thrown over/flown over prison walls (drones)
  New or returning prisoners (including those on release  
on temporary licence and recalls).
Little is known about the frequency with which each route 
is used, or which is prominent in any place at a given time, 
but it is likely that if one becomes harder, attempts to use 
alternative importation routes kick in. We heard anecdotally 
from prisoners that dealers in prison tended to prioritise 
multiple means of importation at any time, to mitigate 
against potential losses and lessen risk of interruption to 
the business should one route be discovered. However, it is 
difficult to know just how much truth there is in these claims 
and how generalizable such observations are, prison drug 
markets were able to respond to clampdowns in any one 
area, and while some could reduce availability short-term, 
those profiting would quickly attempt to find another way  
to import. However, despite prohibited drugs being a 
significant and growing problem in prisons, only one 
government study has analysed the issue of drug trafficking 
into prisons. Notably, staff corruption is rarely overtly 
acknowledged as a problem. 
A now dated Home Office study in 2005 asked just 158 
prisoners, ex-prisoners and staff to identify the primary 
smuggling routes and suggested that prisoners’ social 
visits were the main route, followed by postage and newly 
incoming prisoners (Blakey, 2005). Yet while there are several 
factors which enable or drive criminality in prison,  
it is unarguable that a great deal of prison-based criminality 
is a continuation of the offending behaviour demonstrated in 
the community. It is predatory, exploitative, and parasitic and 
frequently linked to prison drug markets and prison debts. 
That said, not all nefarious activities in prison are linked to 
prison drug markets. Serious violence in prison can be as 
simple as young men stealing a pair of trainers from another 
and the violence that occurs in the act or in retribution for 
such an act, and it does not follow that all prison crime is 
organised crime or driven by instrumental motivations. 
“It can be difficult to know what is behind the violence,  
I mean, I have seen some people slashed and stabbed, 
and not all of it is over drugs or debt, a lot is, but then 
there are other things, a silly falling out over very little in 
prison can escalate and people end up getting seriously 
hurt. That is something I would say has changed. 
Prisoners now, it isn’t a punch in the face, it’s weapons, 
it’s nasty, it is serious violence used very quickly.”  
(Prison Officer)
“Yes, violence can happen for all sorts of reasons, but 
there are two that too many of the idiots in here have 
forgotten now, don’t pretend to be something that you 
are not, and don’t try and buy what you don’t have the 
cash to afford. That is basically what is behind almost  
all prison violence.” (Prisoner, Cat C) 
However, what we also know is that prison drug markets 
now often require external complicity, with transactions 
made both in prison and the community. Prisoners (or their 
associates and families) will exchange funds using bank 
accounts and only the drug itself is exchanged in custody. 
The enabler of this new way of doing business is the 
presence of illicit mobile phones which allow such cashless 
transactions to take place.
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Figure 1: Mobile phone user typology (source: Ellison et al., 2018)
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Illicit Mobile Phones
As the NCA note, mobile phone technology has presented  
a serious challenge to the working and operation of prisons, 
in part because:
Mobile phones continue to be a key enabler for those in 
prison involved in SOC. Their illicit presence provides SOC 
offenders with the means to continue to play a full role in 
major criminal enterprises on a national and international 
level, virtually unaffected by physical confinement.  
(NCA, 2018)
The literature and empirical evidence on mobile phones 
in prison is very limited. In a recent governmental study, 
Ellison, and colleagues (2018), explore the use of smuggled 
mobile phones in prison in considerable detail, contrasting 
the views of prison staff and prisoners themselves on why 
and how prisoners increasingly use mobiles inside. The 
qualitative research gave rise, amongst other things, to 
nuanced understandings of mobile phone use, and assisted 
them to develop the typology of prison mobile phone 
users reproduced in Figure 1. They argue that phone use 
is complex and highlight in particular the way that some 
prisoners are forced to hold phones for more sophisticated 
inmates as part of SOC use of mobiles, but suggest various 
rationales for prisoners having phones (Ellison et al, 2018). 
Prisoners we have interviewed have often talked about 
mobile phones, their prevalence and their part in prison 
criminality. Not all prison-based mobiles are used for 
organised crime or to arrange drug transactions and the 
financing of them, and we heard various accounts, for 
example, of perpetrators of domestic violence wanting 
access to mobile phones to attempt to contact victims.  
It is apparent that prison staff recognise that those holding 
mobile phones are not always the main offenders involved 
in the illicit economy, because again this activity is risky for 
them, and rather, they may seek others around them to take 
the ‘charge’ should prohibited items be found. The view 
that many prisoners, ‘want to get hold of mobiles primarily 
to keep in touch with family and friends, they want to say 
goodnight to their children, they want to keep in touch 
regularly to hear the news and maintain intimacy’ (Ellison  
et al, 2018) had little traction amongst practitioner cohorts, 
who noted that all such things occur alongside drug 
transactions and asking for money. Most prison and police 
staff were cynical about the purposes of possessing mobile 
phones and were sceptical about the view that phones were 
kept because of the high cost of prison phone calls or to 
allow for greater family contact:
“They say mobile phones are not used for crime, but 
every phone in prison is a crime, it’s criminal to have 
them, so that tells you something, but they are not just 
used to phone families, they are used to sort things out, 
drugs, money.” (Police Officer)
“It’s like a game of cat and mouse, we often know that 
they are there, and we spend ages searching for them, 
the prisoners enjoy it, to them it is a bit of a game of cat 
and mouse, but you can tell that they are a problem, not 
as much here as some places, but they are a problem. 
That is why in here they retail for about £500 a time. 
That high cost shows we do not have as many as some 
places, but there is a reason people are willing to pay 
£500 for them and that is not just because they are less 
frequent here.” (Prison Custodial Manager)
It is clear that mobile phones are not held exclusively for 
committing crime and were not held exclusively by those 
who were profiting most meaningfully from the trade in 
contraband in prison (Ellison et al, 2018), but prisoners were 
open that their availability facilitated activities associated 
with the prison economy. Additionally, they suggested the 
phones themselves were part of this, as rental values were 
attached to mobile phones or people were forced by debt 
to hold phones for others. Phones therefore were not only 
a key tool for orchestrating serious crime for profit in the 
community, but serious offenders could not operate  
without phones.  
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However, what is certain is that mobile phones, while 
prohibited, are extremely widely available in some prisons 
but at prices significantly higher than in the community. 
Both police and prison staff expressed a great deal of 
general dissatisfaction about the failure to tackle the flow of 
mobile phones into custody and felt that they were being 
failed and unsupported with a problem that could perhaps 
be easily sorted with investment and political will. They 
suggested that better action should be taken to stem the 
influx of mobile telephones into prison custody as a crime 
prevention priority. Several prison staff suggested the reason 
for the continuing inaction against mobile phones was the 
police garnered and used intelligence. However, the police 
officers we interviewed in a focus group, and officers spoken 
to during the research process generally, did not support 
this view and gave a view that on balance, they would rather 
see a systematic attempt at prevention using technology. 
Many expressed similar views that technological attempts 
to prevent use were merited, but additionally suggested that 
at present, weaknesses for prison staff in creating a secure 
regime were equally important. However, it would seem that 
there are ways that phones could be targeted in custody 
if the will existed, and such technology is used in other 
jurisdictions quite successfully.
How can Mobile Phone Use be 
Countered?
  Jamming/blocking: A signal is transmitted to prevent 
the handset receiving its base station signal. All phones 
and sim cards within the jammer’s reach will be blocked, 
including those belonging to prison staff. The method is 
cheap and mostly effective. Interference caused outside 
the prison can, with care, be avoided, but this may 
add to the cost. The Prison (Interference with Wireless 
Technology) Act 2012 enabled the Secretary of State to 
authorise Prison Governors and Directors to use blocking 
technology to detect and investigate the use of mobile 
phones in prison. Grabbing technology can be used to 
make some phones attracted to a fake network, and is 
selective, so nearby residents’ phones can be put on  
an unaffected ‘white list’. Success can be quantified – 
 phones, and their owners, can be identified. Illicit 
phones can be monitored rather than blocked. It is more 
expensive than blanket jamming. Also, if prisoners move to 
satellite phones, then there is an added layer of complexity 
with jamming and this might be the consequence of any 
widespread attempt to block conventional mobile phones.
  Operator disconnection: The 2015 Serious Crime Act 
introduced the power to force mobile phone operators 
to disconnect illicit phones. Yet so far, the relevant 
regulations have not been enacted. Disconnected phones 
and sim cards can be replaced, and mobile operators may 
be unwilling to cooperate.
  Detection: Prisons can be searched for illicit phones.  
Cells and inmates can be searched to find those which are 
missed. Sniffer dogs can be trained to find mobile phones. 
Some phones will escape detection and new ones can be 
brought in to replace those confiscated.
  Promotion of legitimate in-cell telephony: The 
Government’s preferred option has been £7 million on 
introducing in-cell telephony for more jails in England 
and Wales. This technology is already in place at 20 
establishments and plans are under way to extend the 
scheme to another 20 over the next two years. Calls are 
recorded and users can only call a small number of pre-
approved numbers. Active monitoring can be introduced 
if there is any suspicion the service is being abused for 
crime, but this may continue to make mobile phones 
the preferred options for prisoners involved in nefarious 
activity using phones. 
While a great deal of attention has focused on the threat to 
security from mobile phones because they facilitate drug 
dealing, such a view of the security problems presented by 
illicit mobiles might be too limited. It is certainly the case 
that with third and fourth generation internet-enabled 
mobile phones, there has been a rise in visual recording 
of video footage within prisons. It therefore might be 
important, when considering crime in prison, to consider 
how this in and of itself enhances the potential for some 
prisoners to undermine security or to increase the likelihood 
of victimisation. 
A stream of prison-based videos has surfaced in recent years 
showing prisoners victimising other prisoners. Some show 
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prisoners being punched or ‘banged’ for a spliff, whereas 
others show the ritual humiliation of prisoners who have 
been spiked with PS, the creation of Facebook pages such 
as ‘HMP TV’ broadcast through Twitter on locked pages 
such as @187gangsters. The videos broadcast on the latter 
show two naked prisoners on Spice and a prisoner forced to 
read a statement about bullying and beating females before 
being seriously assaulted in his cell leaving him with a nasty 
bleeding head injury and hauls of mobile phones, drugs and 
tobacco held in cells in English jails (Figure 2).
Mobile phones also can be used in order to generate 
income in less obvious ways. Prison produced mobile phone 
videos and images can have a significant value in and of 
themselves. For example, one of the first and most high-
profile prosecutions (of two prisoners at HMP Birmingham 
– Demehl Thomas and Moysha Shepherd) for possessing 
a mobile phone and filming an in-cell rap video included 
footage that has been viewed (at the time of writing) some 
166,052 times.2  With the possibility of video advertising on 
new social media channels, such activity has the potential  
to generate income. Notably the theme of the video involves 
making money, and the video also features advertising for  
a clothing brand and iTunes downloads.
Inevitably, criminals have also spotted the potential of 
drones for achieving nefarious goals, including smuggling 
contraband (including phones) into prisons. Admittedly, 
prisons were already facing significant problems with illicit 
contraband well before drones became available, with drugs 
smuggled in successfully during prison visits, thrown over  
the wall or reaching inmates via bribed prison guards. 
Another point of weakness in some prison security is the 
susceptibility of prisons to flying drones, which have been 
presented as something of a ‘game-changer’ in terms of 
their ability to carry larger, more dangerous items over 
prison walls, and therefore understandably have caused 
some political concern. In the UK, as recently as 2012-13, 
there were no reported incidents of drones being used to 
smuggle in contraband and only two reported incidents 
in 2014. Just one year later and this figure jumped to 33. 
However, looking at the significance of drones in terms 
of their role in facilitating the importation of contraband 
has been made more complex because of the lack of 
coordination and information gathering. However, it does 
appear that while drones constitute a threat, the number of 
incidents reported where drones have been caught trying 
to deliver contraband into prisons hardly suggests that 
the problem has reached endemic levels, and while it is 
possible that a number of successful deliveries have gone 
undetected (especially if they are delivered at night and are 
not observed by the authorities) there is currently not a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that drones are a main route of 
importation.
Yet quadcopters type drones often used for smuggling in 
recorded cases are widely commercially available, capable 
of being precisely manoeuvred using GPS technology and 
able to carry up to 1.5kg, can easily be bought for less than 
£1,000 and flown with minimal training. The possibility of 
this form of importation increasing is one to be alert to. 
‘Throw overs’ seem to be more common that drones, and 
essentially is a term used to describe any act which involves 
packets being tossed or otherwise hurled over prison walls 
into prison yards and areas accessible by trusted prisoners, 
who will then convey and distribute the prohibited items 
(often drugs, but also alcohol such as vodka, mobile 
phones and chargers, sim cards, USBs, weapons) to other 
inmates. While these throw overs are often wrapped in quite 
rudimentary ways and can be prone to interception, the 
geographical location of several big urban prisons mean  
that this is as effective a manner as using drones.  
In some instances, there can be more sophistication so 
throw overs can be catapulted or hauled into prisons, and 
there is evidence from some prisons of animals (such as 
pigeons) being killed and gutted to serve as packaging for 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fA_zSZuqYgQ
Figure 2
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drug throw overs, but this is largely the exception rather 
than the norm. However, the proximity of some prisons 
to local communities, roads and transport links mean that 
throw overs are a continual frustration for prison staff: 
“I remember in the summer, the lads were all taking their 
deodorants, you know, the roll-ons onto the yard, and 
they were all like, it’s hot miss, hot weather… at first we 
thought hmm, that doesn’t seem right you know, and 
it wasn’t, what it was is they were using it as well, you 
know, lube, during a time when there were a lot of throw 
overs coming in. That is how we knew about it, them 
taking their deodorants onto the yard.” (Prison Officer) 
A route that has long been conducive to prisoners taking 
illicit items into custody has been smuggling – either on 
their person, or internally in a process commonly known as 
‘plugging’ or ‘swallowing’ (and hence conveying prohibited 
items in the body internally). A recent HMIP inspection 
report (2018) suggested that there was “some evidence” 
that prisoners recalled on licence were trafficking drugs 
into HMP Hull. According to prisoners, this practice is 
common and may have increased as an unforeseen and 
unintended consequence of the Government’s policy of 
increasing supervision and licence requirements for short 
sentence prisoners as part of the ‘transforming rehabilitation’ 
initiative. The scale of the profit margins was such that some 
individuals released on license (particularly those on short 
sentences) would deliberately jeopardise their freedom and 
return to custody on ‘license recall’ with the sole purpose 
of financial gain. Others commit relatively minor offences 
in the knowledge that it might attract short custodial 
sentences and offer an opportunity to sell drugs within the 
prison. Prisoners described what were in effect, very short-
term ‘ghost sentences’ masking the true reasons for an 
individual’s criminal behaviour. In such cases, imprisonment 
was not just an occupational hazard but a business venture 
and opportunity: 
“Well, I know a lad who does nothing but little silly 
sentences. He’ll go and do a stupid shoplifting just so 
he’ll come in plugged up to make his money again, so 
he’ll come back out and take the missus to the Bahamas 
and stupid holidays, so it’s serious money. Well, one 
Kinder Egg full of Spice can make you anything up to 
£4,000 or £5,000, so if you’ve got three of those inside 
you that’s 15 grand.” (Prisoner, Cat C)
Whilst such reports might appear anecdotal, as we continued 
our research, it was apparent that such patterns were more 
widespread, particularly in local prisons holding people on 
remand or only for short periods (also see HMIP, 2015: 8).
“A lot of these lads will tell you: “Hey, I can make more 
money in here than they can on the outside”, and really 
there is no reason to doubt that. Some say to my staff: 
“I make more money than you”. I do not doubt that. 
Sometimes it is boastful, but then some of the time it is 
true, undeniably.” (Prison Governor)
However, those swallowing and plugging items were not 
the offenders profiting most extensively from drug dealing 
in custody, and very often were individuals who were held in 
low regard in the criminal and prison hierarchy. As the HMIP 
report on Hull highlighted, it is of concern that there was  
“no clear strategy for identifying [these prisoners], assessing 
the risks or taking action”. That is now not a universal, 
and below we offer some comment on the DORIS 
scheme in Wales which has sought to assist in identifying 
prisoners who internally secrete items within their persons 
for transport into prisons, but drugs are far less readily 
detectable than phones where the use of the boss chair, 
poles and handheld detectors have had some success in 
detecting inward trafficking. There is an emerging evidence 
that prisoners are engineering situations where prisoners 
deliberately breach their licence conditions, so they are  
sent back inside to smuggle in more drugs, but what is less 
well-known is the motive for this, and whether it is driven 
by choice and calculation, coercion or a range of all. 
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Staff Corruption
As McCarthy has suggested: ‘Prison corruption has been  
a persistent and troublesome feature of correctional history’ 
(McCarthy, 1984: 113). On an immediate pragmatic and 
realistic reading, corruption occurs in the prison system in  
a variety of forms. However, as an academic concern, prison 
corruption remains relatively under-researched (Goldsmith  
et al, 2016). Given broader concerns particularly regarding 
the contemporary state and character of prisons in England 
and Wales, there is a strong argument in favour of more 
serious engagement with the issue, and better proactive 
approaches to limit corruption. 
The issue of prison staff corruption is of course not 
clear-cut, and what can be considered corrupt practice 
arguably runs a continuum from unjust use of force 
through to serious malfeasance, perhaps in some instances 
underpinned by corporate aims. However, while prison 
corruption might be a somewhat amorphous concept,  
a useful operational definition is provided by the National 
Offender Management Service, who define the issue thus: 
Corruption occurs when a person in a position of authority 
or trust abuses their position for their or another person’s 
benefit or gain. In NOMS, this would include the misuse 
of their role in order to plan or commit a criminal act, or 
a deliberate failure to act to prevent criminal behaviour. 
This includes actual or attempted conveying of restricted 
items into prisons, aiding escape, unauthorised disclosure 
of information, accepting or seeking bribes, inappropriate 
relationships, blackmail, taking or seeking money or 
other favours for commercial purposes, for moving or 
reclassifying prisoners, or theft of prisoner’s money or 
property. (NOMS, 2016b).
At the simplest level, ‘prison staff corruption’ is broad and 
potentially wide ranging, encompassing a plethora of 
activities that range from individual practices to systemic, 
high level malfeasance. Yet as Souryal (2009: 21) notes: 
‘prison corruption, although relatively invisible to the public 
can, in the long-term, cause much more social damage’. 
At the macro level, all staff and prisoners are put at risk of 
serious injury by smuggled weapons or substances that 
create volatility and underpin the prison sub-rosa economy. 
All corruption ultimately undermines legitimate authority  
of the state.
Compiling a full picture of prison officer corruption 
on media accounts alone is problematic, as there is a 
lamentable tendency at times to regard it as potentially 
reflecting badly on the agency or establishment if it comes 
to the attention of the press.
Some press commentators have averred that: ‘The prison 
service is suppressing evidence of widespread corruption 
among its own officers’ (Holmes, 2016). While undeniably 
the clear majority of staff are honest and hard-working and 
want to see corrupt staff dealt with because they present  
a danger to prison safety and security of staff and prisoners 
alike. It is quite possible that the number of finds of sim 
cards, phones and narcotics found in prisons are transported 
in by corrupt staff and officials, and yet, this issue gets far 
less attention that prisoner family/friend complicity in drug 
smuggling, drones and prisoner importation.
A clear problem with prison staff corruption is while it is 
likely a significant factor contributing to the rise of crime 
in prison, responses to it have been largely reactive rather 
than preventative. It has been suggested that drives to 
recruit staff, poor screening and attempts at infiltration into 
prisons by organised crime affiliates may have been under 
considered, and a better resourced and more considered 
approach to targeting potentially corrupt staff may be 
needed. Several prisons consulted during the research 
suggested they had experienced the very problem of 
infiltration recently, with one establishment in the Midlands 
recording 13 staff who had been suspended and arrested 
in the last 12 months through OCGs exploiting them to 
bring drugs in. Indeed, given that several prisoners (without 
naming names) talked quite openly about staff corruption 
further suggests that it is a problem that requires tackling. 
Every prison captures intelligence of staff corruption, 
but there is limited amount of resource for proactive 
investigation. Additionally, corrupt officers or prison staff do 
not appear to receive lengthy prisons sentences and there is 
a tendency for staff corruption to be under recognised and 
regarded as a problem best not acknowledged openly. 
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“I think the fact is that we are a lot further along in terms 
of our understanding about what SOC and serious 
organised crime offenders look like, and the prison 
service, they don’t see that. They see compliant ‘good 
lads’ people who are well-behaved. But we see those 
guys in the community, we know that they run the drugs 
while remaining very hands off. We know that they 
orchestrate the violence but do not do it themselves. 
Basically, when they get into prison they act in the same 
way, it’s a continuation of their offending behaviour in 
the community, but for the prison, they are no trouble. 
Before long they are the enhanced prisoners on  
the wing with all their privileges and freedoms.”  
(Police Officer)
Police, prison, criminal justice staff and prisoners suggested 
that often those who sit at the top of the criminal 
hierarchy and control prison supply are prisoners who 
have established reputations for serious criminality and 
are recognised as OCG nominals. This group often have 
several prior custodial sentences and a wider reputation for 
involvement in community-based organised crime, giving 
substantial criminal kudos. Indeed, access to firearms and 
a history of serious offending seem extremely common 
(we elaborate further on this typology below). Yet prison-
based criminal entrepreneurs require networks and 
associates beyond the prison walls. Successful prison-based 
criminal entrepreneurs consolidate power by eliminating 
or subjugating rivals, taking control of key aspects of 
prison life (including contraband flows), and winning the 
capacity to mete out rewards and punishments to other 
inmates, and latent violent potential and a ‘reputation’ are 
significant aspects of this. A Category B prisoner identified 
as associated with an OCG group and incarcerated for an 
offence involving drugs and firearms for example described 
how he became established as a prison dealer: 
“From the conventional to the cunning, by design or 
device, through fear or intimidation… these criminal 
gangs will stop at nothing to maintain their access to 
such a lucrative market. We need to make prison less 
congenial for the modern-day Harry Grouts.”  
(David Gauke)
Arguably what is needed is a greater preventative emphasis 
on the organised criminals who are profiting from the 
trade in narcotics inside and outside of prison and a better 
recognition of how porous the link between prison and 
community now can often be. However, while there may be 
value in recognising those coordinating and profiting from 
prison-based criminality, the reality is that links and roles are 
often complex, temporal and very prone to shift. 
For example, offenders such as Craig Hickinbottom (who 
played the ‘leading role’ as part of a coordinated gang 
of ten others from his prison cell at HMP Hewell in the 
Midlands to carry out 49 drone flights into a number of 
prison establishments, with some flights carrying individual 
payloads worth an estimated £85,000-£1.2 million) is 
perhaps in many ways typical of the type of offender who 
profits from criminality in mainstream adult male prisons. 
While often relatively superficially compliant in custody, 
those offenders involved in facilitating and controlling 
prison drug markets seemingly often share a range of 
commonalities, not least that often there are serious 
suspicions about ringleaders and there is strong suspicion 
about their role within the establishment. However, 
it is worth noting that if drugs are entering prison 
establishments, there are external enablers who are often  
as significant in the role in importation as internal facilitators, 
and accounts we heard suggested that such networks could, 
in some instances, show extreme levels of organisation and 
sophistication existing external to the prison establishment, 
a fact borne out by police practitioners:
8   Who is Involved
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They often have established reputations for violence and 
criminality but replicate their community offending in 
prison in a sophisticated manner, where they are involved 
in planning the logistics of drug supply and profit from 
the enterprise, while minimising the risk of sanction for 
themselves. Such ‘leading figures’ don’t take drugs, aren’t 
violent to staff or other prisoners, are intelligent and 
articulate, and offer reassurance to staff with their exemplary 
behaviour. They are often unwilling to touch mobile 
phones or narcotics if they can help it, but rather empower 
others to act on their behalf. In short, these skilled criminal 
manipulators do their utmost to prevent disrupted business. 
We might suggest that often experienced prison staff know 
who the core nominals involved in illicit activity are (as do 
many Police Forces, Regional Crime Units and the National 
Crime Agency). However, by virtue of being ‘off the streets 
and inside’ and largely ‘no trouble at all’ for prison staff, 
these prisoners can undermine the imperative and drive to 
recognise such offenders as a problem, because they make 
their way into trusted positions as cleaners, workers, peer 
mentors and the like, a view that some prison officers were 
all to ready to give:
“You want to know about violence in this place you are 
looking at the right people [the trusted prisoners] they 
may not do all the violence themselves, but don’t believe 
them if they tell you they are stopping it. If you are asking 
me, my opinion, I would say that probably 80-90% of 
the violence in this place could be tracked back to their 
doors if you followed it properly. Not all of them, but 
some of them, they are the biggest… drug dealers in this 
jail.” (Prison Officer)
Ineffective or delayed responses to intelligence or suspicions 
that such individuals are involved in ongoing criminality 
can create the opportunities or conditions for exploitation, 
manipulation, intimidation, violence and the trafficking in 
contraband that serve to further harm and destabilise the 
prison, but as significantly, the ripple effects of their actions 
in prison can make waves in the prison, leading to general 
frustrations that some of the main actors involved in supply 
are little concerned by: 
“People know not to XXXX with me, I have a lot of added 
time, a lot of getting shipped and ghosted for violence, 
a lot of bad stuff that I have done, a lot of stuff that gets 
talked about, my reputation is known, I am known in 
other jails. I am known for what I have done, stabbed 
people, battered people done some proper XXXX. I am 
also known because I have the nice gear, people know 
what I did out there on road, and they know what I do in 
here. They know if they try and walk over me, they might 
end up having difficulty walking at all.” (Prisoner, Cat B)
The prisoner quoted above, superficially appeared to be 
something of a model inmate. Over recent years he had not 
received adjudications, had not been involved in fights or 
assaults and notionally at least seemed the model prisoner. 
However, on a prison wing and away from the authorities, 
he was willing to admit he remained heavily involved in 
the drug trade and was making several hundred pounds 
a week in his current establishment but expressed regret 
that this was considerably less than when incarcerated in 
a large Category B local where he was making even more 
substantial sums. 
“It isn’t a secret, people know, I mean we know the 
names of the local OCG nominals who are in the prisons 
and who are running things. We know who leading 
players are and what we look like. We have been locking 
them up and the security departments, they know who 
they are. The thing is in prison they are clever, they do 
not necessarily get involved themselves though. They are 
often good prisoners for staff, and it is hard to convince 
prison officers that these guys who they have got as 
enhanced, who seem to be well-behaved, that they can 
be the real problem in the establishment.”  
(Prison Governor)
Our interviews both with those involved in prison drug 
dealing and those prisoners who were consumers, but not 
dealers, suggest that many of the most serious OCG actors 
in prison are very superficially compliant.  
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The Contemporary Prison Hierarchy
In mapping out the part of drug dealing in prison custody 
it is important to recognise the way that the phenomenon 
is structured and organised. However, there has been 
little academic work that has sought to map out the 
phenomenon or show how it operates in practice. Some 
of that which does exist is now relatively dated (Crewe, 
2006) and perhaps gives a better historical picture than 
a contemporary one, especially as the previous trade in 
narcotics until the last decade tended to centre around 
heroin and was slightly specialist and niche rather than 
mainstream. 
The contemporary phenomenon of prison drug dealing 
seems to be somewhat hierarchical and graduated, 
following organised crime models, and reflecting the 
hierarchy in the criminal fraternity from main leading role 
figures through to more marginal purchaser-consumers. 
While clearly some prison-based crimes are based on 
‘beefs’ and conflicts in the community, the notion of ‘gangs’ 
outside imported into prison being the main driver of prison 
criminality is problematic as ‘gang-involved prisoners do 
not appear to be recreating gang entities found in the 
community when in the prison’ (Setty et al., 2014). 
Prison is a specific social world, in which attitudes, 
allegiances and loyalties developed in the community are 
imported into custody, and these include morals and values 
that may be different to the mainstream norms held in 
society. Prisoners in England and Wales report committing 
offences to get money to buy drugs, but also prisons are 
now more frequently the places where the illicit drug  
dealers detected and profiting in the community reside,  
and increasingly the organised crime business is one 
that has moved away from serious planned, violent and 
acquisitive crime (particularly armed robbery) to one where 
most profit and most serious criminal entrepreneurs have 
diverse involvement in illicit and licit activity, but where 
serious criminality frequently involves the trade in narcotics  
(Hobbs, 2013).
The contemporary prison hierarchy follows something of 
a structured system, where those who are at the top of the 
social strata in prisoner terms are often the offenders who 
are involved in the illicit economy as coordinators, often 
“For five guys to be dropping on association, you have 
to understand the knock-on effect that it has within 
the prison. In terms of staff being brought from this 
wing to come and deal with it, staff being brought from 
healthcare to deal with this so they’ve been all been 
called there, so that has a knock-on effect for that wing 
they’re not getting their association over there. This 
wing is not getting their medical or treatment or their 
medication when they’re supposed to be getting it, so 
they are kicking off now, their stress levels are going up.” 
(Prisoner, Category B) 
However, organised crime in prison custody has links into 
the community which sustain and enable it, and some of 
this shows a high degree of coordination and organisation 
involving serious complicity with external actors. Police 
and some prison sources tend to confirm that the more 
sophisticated SOC-affiliated individuals are the more 
likely they are to adopt a general (if ultimately superficial) 
compliance with rules and regulations and often prefer,  
and in many instances actively seek, to cultivate a prison 
routine subject to minimal disruption whilst maintaining 
maximum freedom of movement and trust from prison  
staff. They are, in short, often well-versed conditioners  
and corruptors. 
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described as involved in ‘business’ or as business men.  
These offenders often mimic organised crime related 
activities in the community, devolving down aspects of 
their illicit enterprise while not handling products and illicit 
items themselves, but devolving that function down to a 
middle strata of middle men, foot soldiers and ‘lads’ who will 
conduct transactions for them. Some prisoners will largely 
avoid involvement, and hence be involved in prison life but 
eschew involvement and progress to enhanced status and 
sought jobs, becoming what some prisoners describe as 
‘screw boys’.
Whilst all typologies are imperfect, and there is a degree of 
fluidity in terms of who occupies certain roles, this diagram 
serves to illustrate not only how the social hierarchy has 
changed, but also how the hierarchy relates to violence, 
the illicit economy and ongoing criminality in prisons. The 
terms used are those used by the men themselves, are in 
themselves illustrative of the hierarchy as those roles at the 
bottom of the hierarchy tend to be more stigmatising.
  ‘Business Men’: Men who orchestrate, coordinate and 
ultimately earn money from the illicit economy in prisons. 
They are often likeable and charismatic individuals who 
able to form good relationships with staff and their peers. 
They may be on enhanced regime and occupy roles of 
responsibility (e.g. mentors, cleaners, representatives) 
whilst finding ways to avoid detection by using others 
to do their dirty work. They may already be identified 
as organised crime nominals in the community. They 
succeed by ‘flying under the radar’ and are able to 
simultaneously hold down an appearance of ‘legitimate 
business’ with one of illegitimate business (as they were 
accustomed to doing in the community). They might ‘talk 
the talk’ in terms of rehabilitation, but they may not always 
‘walk the walk’. 
  ‘Screw Boys’: Men who occupy positions of responsibility 
within the prison, including mentors, representatives, 
council members, listeners, and orderlies. They are 
typically enhanced prisoners who have good relationships 
with staff. They tread a careful line in ‘making the jail work 
 Figure 3: The Contemporary Prison Hierarchy
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for them’ and therefore need to both maintain convivial 
relationships with staff, but without getting too close to 
staff and therefore attracting the disdain of their peers. 
  The ‘Middle Men’ and ‘Foot Soldiers’ are typically working 
at the behest of the Business Men. They will typically 
enforce and punish non-payment of debt, traffic and hold 
contraband, maintain, hold the debt lists (with details of 
bank accounts, individuals, amounts), send threatening 
notes, verbally threaten and intimidate peers or demand 
certain duties are performed (e.g. cleaning out someone 
else’s cell). 
  ‘Foot Soldiers’ may be acting under duress, and therefore 
be both a victim and a perpetrator. Their role is less likely 
to be consensual, and careful attention should therefore 
be paid to those who are assaulting others, collecting 
or trafficking contraband, or holding contraband since 
it might be as a result of intimidation rather than willing 
involvement. 
  The ‘Lads’ are prisoners with some degree of status and 
respect from their peers. They may be connected with 
the Business Men and Foot Soldiers, but not necessarily 
involved in the illicit economy, drug economy or in the 
violence and conflict that might frame everyday life. That 
said, for the Business Men and Middle Men, they play an 
important role in demonstrating social support, which can 
be intimidating to more vulnerable prisoners. They may 
also come to the aid of the Business Men and Middle Men 
as and when needed. 
  Both ‘Firm Hoppers’ and ‘Grasses’ are seen as disloyal 
men who can’t be trusted. They violate the ‘prison code’ 
and may be punished through physical violence for doing 
so. Whilst ‘Firm Hoppers’ are those who may be involved 
in two organised crime groups (and therefore violate trust 
by betraying business interests), ‘Grasses’ are those who 
are seen as informers. 
  ‘Spice Heads’ are those who cannot control their drug 
habit, and therefore routinely disrupt the regime and 
come to the attention of staff. They are often likely to 
struggle to manage their debt, and therefore move 
between wings or seek sanctuary in segregation. They 
may lose respect and be dismissed by their peers as a 
result. That said, they do not attract the same disrespect 
or stigma as those who misuse heroin and were, in earlier 
decades, labelled as ‘Smack Heads’. 
  ‘Mamba Muppets’ are those who are used to test the 
quality of the drugs. In light of the unpredictable nature 
and effects of drugs such as psychoactive substances, 
those who sell psychoactive substances have a vested 
interest in ensuring that the batches are not of low 
or inferior quality. However, this quality testing has 
a pernicious undertone, and can be accompanied 
with requests to perform certain embarrassing acts 
as a form of perverse entertainment, punishment, 
deliberate degradation or ritual humiliation. The filming 
of such incidents creates a form of ‘global humiliation’ 
and subjects the prisoner to sustained and ongoing 
humiliation. 
  ‘The Nerds’ and the ‘Fraggles’ are those who are 
more vulnerable prisoners who are the focus of 
extortion, exploitation, violence, theft and robbery. 
Their indebtedness may arise from extortion as more 
sophisticated prisoners take advantage of their naivety. 
They can be those who have mental or emotional health 
concerns, are young and/or first time in custody, but 
the key defining characteristics are that they are seen 
as physically and socially inept, unable to ‘handle’ their 
sentence or ‘do their time’.
  ‘It’ – In mainstream prisons, there is little acceptance 
of transgender prisoners, who are typically stigmatised 
and labelled as ‘It’. They may be vulnerable to sustained 
victimisation and find it difficult to develop good 
relationships with their peers. They are likely to be socially 
excluded.
  People convicted of sex offences are often labelled as 
‘Nonces’. They are often routinely and systematically 
victimised through social exclusion, extortion (including 
demands to pay “cell rent”), exploitation, theft, robbery 
and physical violence.
The Business Men and Screw Boys sit at the top of the prison 
strata, and these categories necessarily are not so much 
as exclusive but overlapping. Often, those coordinating 
involvement in illicit trade at the higher echelons may be 
those in sought prison jobs, recorded as enhanced status, 
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and superficially appear compliant, often working towards 
category D status, and a difficulty can be separating those 
prisoners complying with the prison regime legitimately 
from those who will do it to provide a smokescreen for illicit 
activity. However, those coordinating the illicit economy in 
prison, the ‘business men’ can prove hard to identify, but we 
would suggest that some of the following stands out.
Prisoners as ‘business men’ coordinating serious criminality 
in prison and outside often have biographies where the 
following is significant:
  Identified and convicted of serious offences and have 
long sentences (4+ years) often drugs and serious violent 
crime.
  Been involved (historical or continuing) in legitimate 
business, and haulage and transport (haulage/taxis), 
bars/catering/beauty shops (e.g. hairdressing/tanning)/
car washes/car sales/shops (supplements) and means 
of laundering money with close connections through 
partners/family/spouse.
  Likely to be involved in higher strata drug importation/
distribution in community.
 Often have markers for firearms offences.
 Have a reputation (historical) for violence.
  Are of good (current) behaviour in prisons (lack of 
adjudications/warnings).
  Have significant prior experience of custody (including 
youth custody) but may have historically been challenging 
and difficult in custody.
  Are shrewd, show common sense, have above average 
intelligence, and are well regarded by staff and prisoners 
generally, deferred to and regarded as stabilising 
influences.
 Will generally avoid drug taking themselves.
  Have localised reputation for violence (historically)  
in community and family name.
  Have a network in prison of friends and associates, 
demonstrate signs of affluence (high expense designer 
clothing, trainers and watches) need for nothing in 
custodial environment.
 Receive regular visits.
  Likely to be enhanced status, show keenness to work to D 
category in short or long-term. 
It can prove difficult to identify the business men from 
legitimate prisoners generally. However, and crucially, 
those who are the malign influences in custody may not 
be the most disruptive, difficult and challenging prisoners, 
and may not themselves be involved in the dirty work of 
doing violence. Rather they franchise out much of this 
to subordinates whilst maintaining control of the prison 
market. 
Middle Men and Foot Soldiers essentially act as muscle and 
workers for those Business Men. Again, often these prisoners 
occupy some position of status and privilege in custody 
and roles such as wing cleaners, servery workers and 
status ‘rep’ positions, but may be more prone to showing 
signs and symptoms of involvement in criminal activity in 
custody (see following page) as they orchestrate the day-
to-day trade in narcotics. As an illicit market, the prison 
drug trade is regulated by violence, and hence on occasion 
these prisoners will be the ones who commit assaults or 
come to attention for holding prohibited items, but they 
too may devolve such activities away from themselves or 
use incentive or threat to get others to act on their behalf. 
Often such prisoners are also more marked by the affluence 
they show on wings, such as having ‘Fat Pads’, cells that are 
abundant in food, consumables, clothing and signs of status, 
becoming involved periodically in violence, possessing the 
property of others and generally appearing as the main 
figures on a wing.
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Firm Hoppers are essentially free agents who act for 
different organised crime groups but without displaying 
group loyalty. They will avail themselves of opportunities, 
while attempting not to be implicated as informers. Such 
individuals however occupy a lesser position of trust from 
Business Men who recognise loyalty rather than individual 
self-interest. 
Prisoners who are regarded favourably are generally placed 
in a category of lads where they navigate the complex 
dynamics of imprisonment without being victimised or 
finding themselves in debt or at threat. They tend to act in 
a relatively conformist manner and serve their time, largely 
seeking to avoid confrontation and conflict. Of course, 
amongst these prisoners there will be some who are 
involved in illicit markets and drugs as consumers, and it is 
important that the model we suggest of the prison hierarchy 
is necessarily a dynamic one that can fluctuate and change 
with individuals moving and shifting between roles. 
The lower strata of the prison hierarchy are prisoners who 
are regarded as Fraggles and Muppets, those who cannot 
control drug dependency (and become known as ‘Spice 
Heads and Mamba Muppets’), are affected by mental health 
problems, or fall into debt. Such prisoners can be exploited 
for entertainment, used to test batches of drugs, bullied, 
and used as a useful distraction from more nefarious 
criminal activities. These prisoners rather than presenting 
as unproblematic often show signs and symptoms of 
victimisation (opposite) and can be threatened and coerced 
into acting for more established prisoners, or seek to use 
disruption as a means of gaining assistance and attention. 
Finally, there are prisoners often regarded as inherently 
flawed and fair game for violence. Such subordinated 
prisoners often include transsexual prisoners (often 
referred to as ‘It’ by other prisoners and subject to ongoing 
victimisation), and those who are sex offenders or commit 
Figure 4 (source: Gooch and Treadwell, 2015)
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crimes against children (‘Nonces’) who are often positioned 
as inherently vulnerable and are at risk of being assaulted 
on many mains wings. There are also chronic debtors who 
attempt to avoid repayment and similarly can show signs 
and symptoms of victimisation. It is worth remembering 
that a significant proportion of the prison population are 
vulnerable, some are socially inept, and many lacks the skills 
that mainstream society requires. Hence, the judicial system 
deals with these people and segregates them in custody 
quite frequently. While in custody they may look to conduct 
themselves in a socially acceptable manner, they will never 
be accepted to the more instrumental criminals and serious 
offenders at the upper echelons of the serious organised 
crime fraternity and their associates.  
Figure 5 (source: Gooch and Treadwell, 2015)
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Young Offenders/Young Adults
In YOIs, prisoners use labels such as ‘King of the Wing’ 
or ‘Top Dog’ to describe those prisoners who occupied 
the highest echelons of the prisoner hierarchy. These are 
prisoners who are ‘typically responsible for running and 
coordinating nefarious trade activities on the wing’ and most 
notably, ‘the supply of contraband’ (Gooch and Treadwell, 
2015: 32). The King of the Wing was the most powerful 
individual on the wing, often afforded status because of 
their involvement in criminal enterprise both inside and 
outside custody, their reputation in the outside community, 
their physical appearance or custodial reputation. Few 
prisoners achieved this level of status, power and control. 
This suggests that in some instances, those behaving in 
nefarious ways in custody may begin early and learn these 
roles before adult custody. In YOIs, researchers describe 
this emergent key nominal role as often involving young 
individuals who:
…often had a relatively extensive criminal history, even 
though that was not always reflected in convictions alone. 
The King of the Wing was often the centre of activity 
during association and other periods where prisoners were 
unlocked together. Other prisoners deferred to them and 
were intimidated by them. Due to their elevated position 
in the prisoner hierarchy, the King of the Wing acted like a 
‘puppet master’ and was able to ‘pull the strings’ of others 
around them, through a blend of either threat or menace 
or bribery. The King of the Wing would associate with 
landing cleaners and debt collectors, requiring them to 
act at their behest to pass items or enforce debts without 
necessarily becoming directly involved themselves.  
(Gooch and Treadwell, 2015: 32)
This can be regarded perhaps as a stage of transitioning,  
as many of those who become more serious OCG nominals 
of the future have similar pathways into lifelong persistent 
criminality. In particular, they may show association with 
other serious offenders, early onset criminality, which often 
includes difficult upbringings, experience of trauma, poor 
educational attainment, and the shift toward an increasing 
pursuit of a hedonistic lifestyle featuring illicit drugs and 
conspicuous consumption as they age, with growing 
severity of offending. Yet OCG nominals seem to mature 
and grow in sophistication in contrast with peers. 
The Women’s Prison Estate
Generally, the women’s prison estate sees less evidence of 
high levels of violence currently encountered in much of 
the male estate, but that does not mean that there are not 
significant challenges brought about by illicit drugs. So too, 
while the women’s estate does not see the same levels of 
violence as the men’s, the illicit trade in narcotics in female 
establishments may well link with self-harm, which tends  
to be heightened in women’s jails.
In the wake of reports of a 51-year-old transgender prisoner, 
Karen White, having been charged with committing four 
sexual offences against inmates at a women’s jail in West 
Yorkshire, debate has resurfaced around the place of trans 
prisoners in the prison estate and issues of safety. Indeed, 
the issue of trans prisoners has received significant attention 
periodically and much of this has been formed variously 
around debates about safety and security. Academics 
such as Professor Azrini Wahidin have suggested that 
‘Radical changes are needed to protect serving transgender 
prisoners’ (Wahidin, 2018). Much of the debate has 
been framed around either the risk of harm transgender 
prisoners presents to themselves when confined in prison 
custody, or the risk that transgender prisoners identifying 
as female might present in the women’s prison estate. 
The matter has divided commentators and interest groups 
and proved extremely controversial and shows no sign of 
abating since the British Government has announced they 
will be reforming the Gender Recognition Act, allowing 
trans-people to self-identify without needing a psychiatric 
evaluation from a medical professional to confirm they  
are trans. Some groups such as Fair Play for Women and  
Dr Nicola Williams have suggested that the current direction 
of policy is dangerous given that half of all transgender 
prisoners are sex offenders or category A [high security] 
inmates (Williams, 2017). While these claims have not been 
wholly accepted (Fisher, 2017) it would seem an appropriate 
time to consider issues of transgender prisoners and safety 
and security. However, this is difficult as official figures 
regarding the number or type of convictions of trans-
identifying male inmates in the prisons of England and Wales 
suggest low numbers and may not give a full picture.
9    A Heterogeneous Prison 
Estate
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It is also worth noting that the issue of trans prisoners is 
not only being debated in the UK. In the US, the Bureau 
of Prisons has recently reversed and rescinded rules that 
allowed transgender inmates to use facilities that match 
their gender identity, including cell blocks and bathrooms 
and suggested that biological sex at birth alone will 
determine where prisoners are located. In contrast,  
in prisons in England and Wales: 
  2011 policy guidelines for Prisons in England and Wales 
stated that prisoners should normally be located in the 
prison estate of their gender as recognised by UK law.
  In November 2016, the National Offender Management 
Service (NOMS) published a revised policy on transgender 
prisoners (PSI 17/2016). 
  The Ministry of Justice published the first official statistics 
on transgender prisoners. A data collection exercise in 
March/April 2016 showed that there were 70 transgender 
prisoners in 33 of the 123 public and private prisons in 
England and Wales.
  Williams (2017) suggests that she was able to identify 113 
transgender prisoners, 100 located in the male estate and 
13 in the female estate using information from 67 prisons 
as set out in Independent Monitoring Board reports.
Prison Service Instruction (PSI 16/17/2016 The Care and 
Management of Transgender Offenders) says ‘Women 
offenders who present a high risk of harm to other women 
are managed safely in the prison estate. Transgender women 
who pose similar risks should be managed in a similar way  
in the female estate’. 
Yet there is a perhaps a problem here with terminology, 
and we might ask what is ‘similar’? Very few women 
in the women’s estate have been convicted of rape or 
sexual offences against women, and the women’s prison 
estate is discernibly different from that of the men’s. It 
might be legitimate to ask is a transgender woman can 
still be biologically male, as a Gender Reassignment 
Certificate (GRC) has no requirement for the individual to 
have undergone sex reassignment surgery. We might ask 
therefore if a trans prisoner who remains biologically male 
is a similar risk to be managed in a women’s prison? We are 
certainly not asserting that all male transgender prisoners 
are a risk of perpetrating sexual violence against women. 
However, that ought not to simply consider trans prisoners 
as potential perpetrators, as we recognise that that lack 
of empirical research and evidence also means significant 
omissions in the knowledge base about the very real 
problems of victimisation, violence and discrimination that 
trans people face every day, and which trans prisoners may 
face in the male prison estate, particularly as victims  
of violence and sexual violence.
At present, we have too little knowledge regarding the 
experiences of trans prisoners or whether their management 
in custody is successful or not. However, in written evidence 
given to the House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee Transgender Equality (2015), on behalf of the 
British Association of Gender Identity Specialists, Dr James 
Barrett, noted: 
“It has been rather naïvely suggested that nobody would 
seek to pretend transsexual status in prison if this were 
not actually the case. There are, to those of us who 
actually interview the prisoners, in fact very many reasons 
why people might pretend this. These vary from the 
opportunity to have trips out of prison through to a desire 
for a transfer to the female estate (to the same prison as a 
co-defendant) through to the idea that a parole board will 
perceive somebody who is female as being less dangerous 
through to a [false] belief that hormone treatment will 
actually render one less dangerous through to wanting 
a special or protected status within the prison system 
and even (in one very well evidenced case that a highly 
concerned Prison Governor brought particularly to my 
attention) a plethora of prison intelligence information 
suggesting that the driving force was a desire to make 
subsequent sexual offending very much easier, females 
being generally perceived as low risk in this regard.”  
(British Psychological Society, 2015: 4-5)
While we accept that not every trans-identifying male is  
a potential sex offender simply because they may still have 
a penis, conversely it might also be naïve to think that 
some trans-identifying men who are historically sexual 
offenders might not be a risk to women in the female estate. 
A core principle of risk assessment must be that the best 
predictor of future risk is past behaviour, and it is necessary 
to consider the risks of serious crime in all contexts. 
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Additionally, in public service settings there is a climate 
of fear against litigation and allegations of bigotry that 
potentially leads good people to not speak out when they 
have concerns. There is also the problem that the women  
in the estate have little voice, and when those systems 
for safe management fail, there is the potential for more 
women as victims. 
The best approach might be small specialist facilities or 
specialist wings for trans identifying male prisoners in 
the male estate, but that does not stop problems. Would 
a 19-year-old non-violent trans identifying male in for 
breaching community sentence for a non-violent offence 
be best on a wing with far older trans identifying males who 
would otherwise be in the high security estate for rape?  
The issues are complex, but again, in discussions of 
ongoing criminality it highlights that police may be called 
upon to investigate sexual violence in prisons in both the 
male and female estates, and while reported numbers 
of such offences are low (see figure) such investigations 
are complex, and resource intensive, and require good, 
collaborative working relationships between police  
and prisons.
Specialist Prisons for Men Convicted 
of Sex Offences 
There has been a growing tendency in England and Wales  
to locate men convicted of sex offences in dedicated 
prisons, a decision initially motivated by the desire to 
focus resources and the delivery of programmes such as 
the now abandoned Sex Offender Treatment Programme 
(SOTP) within certain prisons. Generally, criminal activity in 
these dedicated prisons is detected on a far less frequent 
basis than in a mainstream Category C prison. Physical 
violence and substances misuse (either of psychoactive 
substances or prohibited substances under the Misuse of 
Drugs) is uncommon and, when it occurs, far less likely to 
result in serious harm. Taking HMP Stafford as an example, 
drugs were found only on two occasions in the year April 
2017–March 2018, and only three times the previous year 
(April 2016–March 2017) (Ministry of Justice, 2018a). In the 
same years, random mandatory drug tests were positive 
(and therefore indicating substances misuse) on only four 
occasions in the year 2017/2018 and only twice in the year 
2016/2017. There were 39 assaults in 2017 and 36 assaults in 
2016, approximately one every ten days (Ministry of Justice 
2018b), compared HMP Oakwood (a Category C prison) 
where there were 375 assaults in 2017 and 419 assaults in 
2016. Moreover, mobile telephones were found on only four 
occasions in the year 2017/2018 and on three occasions the 
year before. 
The seemingly low levels of physical violence, substance 
misuse and contraband trafficking lead some to conclude 
that as a population, men convicted of sex offences are a 
compliant group. There is some truth in this. Men convicted 
of sex offences tend to be far more conscious of: the stigma 
associated with being labelled both as a ‘sex offender’ and 
‘prisoner,’ their location in a ‘sex offender prison,’ the ways 
their behaviour might be constructed, interpreted, perceived 
and monitored within the prison, and more conscious of the 
need to fulfil certain conditions in order to secure release 
and then to succeed on release. The route to release, the 
life and support they can expect on release, and the ability 
to fulfil their license conditions is by no means certain. 
Consequently, men in dedicated prisons can be more 
attuned to the demands made of them by prison staff and 
regulate their behaviour accordingly.
It should also be noted that there are noticeable differences 
in the demographic features of these dedicated prisons. 
Increasingly, those men serving time for sexual offences 
are over the age of 55. For example, in one prison, 55% of 
the population fell into this category. Many are serving their 
first custodial sentence, and fewer men have pre-existing 
substance misuse habits prior to their imprisonment. 
Thus, they are far less likely to have turn to or misuse 
illicit substances – such as heroin, cannabis, psychoactive 
substances, amphetamines or anabolic steroids – that  
are more common in mainstream prisons as a means of 
‘melting the bars away’ and coping with the daily pains  
of imprisonment. 
However, the absence of an economy based on drugs, 
drones and mobile phones does not mean that an illicit 
economy does not exist at all. Rather, sexual activities are 
commoditised and used as a way to bargain, purchase 
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items such as tobacco or food items, and repay debts. Such 
debts tend to be low and do not escalate in the ways seen 
in the mainstream prison population. Consensual and non-
consensual sexual activity is rarely discussed in mainstream 
prisons, reflecting something of the hyper-masculine and 
homophobic culture in the mainstream prisons and the 
uncommon nature of such behaviour. In contrast, sexual 
activity may be openly discussed in dedicated prisons,  
as are the means by which this could be facilitated (such  
as the ‘dark web’) and both consensual and non-consensual 
activity occurred on a relatively regular but not frequent 
basis. ‘Grooming’ of young men by older men is also 
evident. It is also possible that organised crime networking 
can take place in such environments, and it should be 
remembered that Child Sexual Exploitation is regarded as 
a significant area of organised criminal activity in current 
threat assessments of serious organised crime (NCA, 2018).
Within ‘mainstream’ prisons, such prisoners are often 
located on ‘vulnerable prisoner’ wings to reduce the risk 
of victimisation with few prisons successfully operating 
an ‘integrated regime’ where those convicted of sex 
offences live alongside those who have not been (see HMP 
Swinfen Hall as an example). Those who are known to have 
committed a sexual offence are often labelled, stigmatised 
and disregarded as a ‘nonce’ or ‘wrong ‘un’, sometimes 
facing physical violence and reprisal at the hands of their 
peers who judge such ‘punishment’ as entirely justified. 
For those who are homosexual, bi-sexual or transgender, 
victimisation can be endemic and such individuals can find 
themselves the victim of sustained abuse.
Category D (Open) Prisons
More highly trusted, but less supervised prisoners, need not 
to be complacent. Due to the lesser degree of security and 
greater freedom of Category D prisoners, it is conceivable 
that these are the establishments that some SOC nominals 
who continue to coordinate criminality outside of custody 
will want to be in. It is also notable that some low category 
prisons have a high number of OCG nominals, and the 
lessened security of such establishments proves attractive  
to those continuing to profit from ongoing involvement  
in entrepreneurial criminality in the community. 
High Security (Dispersal) Prisons
The High Security Estate (HSE) arguably presents somewhat 
different challenges in terms of crime and criminality to the 
problems associated with mainstream prisons, although, 
there is also intersection. In particular, in the region in recent 
years, High Security Prison has witnessed some rather brutal 
prisoner-on-prisoner homicides, and while these also occur 
in mainstream and local prisons, the nature and character 
of prisons that hold long-term prisoners, lifers and those 
in a minority of instances serving full-life terms makes the 
HSE different. Additionally, the HSE has increasingly come 
to the fore as the more natural place to hold some OCG 
nominals and Terrorism Act (2000) offenders (known as 
TACT prisoners). Ian Acheson’s review found evidence that 
Islamic Extremism (IE) is a growing problem within prisons, 
and a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy is 
required to monitor and counter it, a recommendation that 
is now being implemented.
Interestingly that review recommended a more coordinated 
and rehearsed response to violent incidents generally and 
noted concern that some prisoners sentenced under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and its successors aspire to acts of 
extreme violence which require not only action within 
prisons but oversight and direction from experienced 
operational staff working centrally and that any new strategy 
should focus on greater coordination and cooperation from 
prisons to the police. It also suggested that the present 
system under which TACT and IE prisoners are dispersed 
across prisons should be reviewed, and consideration given 
to containment of known extremists within dedicated 
specialist units.
Of course, prisons in England and Wales (and the UK 
generally) have a long history of coping with terrorists and 
political or religious extremists, but in the aftermath of 
9/11 and the global ‘War on Terror’ the UK has experienced 
an increase in extremists motivated by Islamist ideology. 
Formerly prisoners were largely managed as their Provisional 
IRA (PIRA) forebears were dispersed within the High Security 
Estate (HSE), with further controls applied on the basis 
of assessed risk. Now these controls continue to evolve, 
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drawing on increasing and enhanced intelligence-based 
assessments including increased close collaboration 
between the police and other criminal justice and statutory 
agencies.
Anti-terrorism legislation passed in the aftermath of 
7/7 criminalised those who promoted terrorism, those 
involved in acts preparatory to terrorism and those who 
advocated it without being directly involved. This increase 
in legislative scope was matched by an upsurge in global 
jihadist terrorist violence. The security response to this 
has led to a significant increase in conviction rates for 
terrorist offences. Progressively more of these offenders 
are held outside the HSE (including in Midlands prisons) and 
some are proceeding through the offender management 
system towards release into the community. The recent 
review suggested that such prisoners extend the threat of 
radicalisation beyond those arrested for terrorist offences 
and could be a malign influence on the prison population 
more. Other prisoners – both Muslim and non-Muslim 
– serving sentences for crimes unrelated to terrorism 
are nevertheless vulnerable to radicalisation by Islamist 
Extremists, and it has been argued that there are tensions 
created due to this particularly when formerly OCG affiliated 
individuals use religious conversion to Islam as a strategy 
for distancing themselves from former associates. Current 
trends suggest that the number of prisoners guilty of 
offences relating to terrorism and extremism are likely to 
increase. For instance, it has been reported that around 800 
Britons have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight, and others 
to Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen and Libya. A significant 
number of these have returned to the UK, of whom a 
portion will enter the criminal justice system.  
We can therefore expect the number of TACT and 
IE prisoners to continue to increase with knock-on 
consequences for the scale of the threat of radicalisation  
in prisons.
The High Security Estate (HSE) comprises just eight of the 
prisons in England. The great majority of HSE prisoners 
are non-TACT and non-IE, but those that are interact with 
the majority. Following sentencing, most convicted TACT 
prisoners are allocated to HSE establishments. Obviously, 
items such as mobile phones in the hands of TACT and 
IE prisoners is different to that of organised criminality, 
although there are potential overlaps between the two. 
Additionally, while terrorism might be the highlight concern 
in the HSE and in prisons such as HMP Long Lartin (the only 
high security prison within the Midlands region), we also 
should not be naïve to the issues facing Category B and C 
prisons with organised crime moving into higher security 
establishments. Markets and demand for Spice, Mamba and 
Monkey Dust also exist in high security estate and amongst 
some of its prisoners. While the high security estate is more 
secure against some methods of trafficking, such as prisoner 
plugging and swallowing (although this is possible with 
transfers between local prisons with high amounts of drugs 
and transferred prisoners) throw overs, drones and family 
trafficking; staff corruption may still present a significant 
challenge and threat to the security in high security prisons. 
However, HS prisons can be better placed to disrupt and 
challenge the activities of some core OCG nominals. 
Different prisons can present slightly different threats 
and challenges where ongoing criminality and ongoing 
organised criminality are concerned, and it is important that 
criminal justice agencies are alert to these and recognise the 
threat.  
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While the picture and testimony provided thus far presents 
an alarming picture of the scale, impact and harm caused by 
ongoing criminality in prisons, there is evidence that there 
are a range of initiatives which seem to have enhanced the 
authorities’ ability to respond to crime committed in prison, 
and as importantly to seek to prevent crime in prison. An 
important methodological framework for organised crime 
analysis is being provided by the four Ps model originally 
used to consider terrorist offences: Prevent, Pursue, Protect 
and Prepare. That model is now being incorporated into 
academic considerations of organised crime.
‘Prevent’, for example, focuses upon offenders to prevent 
them from becoming criminal, or from committing more 
serious criminal acts, or joining organised crime groups and 
organisations. ‘Pursue’, on the other hand, focuses upon law 
enforcement to pursue and stop offenders and groups by 
detecting, prosecuting and otherwise disrupting those who 
plan to carry out criminal activities. ‘Protect’ is a strategic 
focus to protect key infrastructures by reducing risks and 
vulnerabilities in order to prevent attack by criminal groups. 
‘Prepare’ promotes a tactical focus upon preparing victims 
for impact and mitigating the effects of criminal groups 
where they cannot be stopped. This provides a useful 
framework for considering how we tackle issues of ongoing 
criminality in prisons. 
Currently, there are a range of initiatives that prove useful 
reference points for how the issues of ongoing criminality in 
prison may be tackled, however, the best mechanisms may 
be based on principles of Situational Crime prevention and 
attempting to make it harder for offenders to deliberately 
be involved in criminality. Based on our empirical research 
and notions drawn from Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
we would suggest the following model of what seem to 
be some of the core facilitators and enabling factors that 
frame and facilitate prison-organised crime. If we can 
understand the core enablers, then look to limit these, it 
stands to reason that crime in prison can be prevented, and 
this is preferable to tackling offences via law enforcement 
approaches. It therefore follows that proactive and 
preventative approaches should be based on understanding 
the interplay of the factors that we suggest underpins 
ongoing criminality and organised crime in prison:
1.  The institutional setting: The type of prison regime and 
prison type, along with structural prison factors, are likely 
to drive some internal differences in the types of crime 
that occur. Most prisons are targets for drug trafficking, 
but factors such as security levels may impact on the 
means of this trafficking. Sex offender prisons may have 
different markets for USB sticks with pornography and 
internet-enabled mobile phones rather than PS – and 
different prisoner populations and prison types give rise  
to differences in crime. 
2.  Motivated/capable offenders: The numbers of offenders 
in the institution who are sufficiently motivated and 
networked to become involved in organised crime or 
to continue their involvement in organised crime (e.g. 
higher OCG nominal numbers may mean more attempts 
to influence outside organised crime). Offenders may 
be motivated by prison deprivations, or they might 
import their motivations and demonstrate affluence 
inside, and in some instances, both may be connected. 
However, they will require the skills and attributes to 
sustain organised crime in prisons – they might be 
knowledgeable of how to sustain drugs supply, have 
the ability to establish networks and, if necessary, have 
the physical attributes (or access to these) in order to 
intimidate potential competitors, debtors or staff. Other 
skills might include technological skills and being digitally 
capable.
3.  Suitable market/consumers: The size of the market 
in the prison for goods/services and the willingness of 
potential customers to consume services provided. We 
should not think only about drug markets internal to 
the prison, for example sex offender prisons may have 
different illicit markets, legitimate products such as 
tobacco may be in great demand across the estate. 
4.  Tools/props for crime: The availability of the props 
required for crime to continue or thrive, for example, 
mobile phones, internet access, bank accounts, resource 
to pay for goods and services. Essentially the availability 
of such items allows connections to the outside world 
to be made and maintained, other tools might be the 
availability of weapons to intimidate or fend off potential 
competition and support monopolies on force or threat.  
10   Local Initiatives
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For those playing a leading role in internal prison 
criminality, the available pool of labour might also be 
conceived of in this way.
5.  Lack of capable guardianship: A lack of willing guardians 
(prison staff/monitoring technologies such as CCTV 
systems) to put a check on crime activities can allow the 
illicit economy to flourish and criminal activity to occur 
with impunity. However, while we may conceive of this 
as people, it can also constitute intelligence failures 
and a failure to appropriately manage information, for 
example highly sophisticated internet sex offenders who 
are not flagged in prison as being prohibited access to 
I.T. systems, or gang injunctions not being prevented 
from association with named peers. These two failures 
in institutional management can lead to the wrong 
prisoners being in roles of privilege and advantage 
(trusted roles) and being approved for ROTL and the like.
6.  Enablers: The number of people within the prison acting 
as crime enablers such as corrupt prison staff willing to 
supply phones, take bribes or even be complicit in not 
raising attention, not submitting IRs, resigning themselves 
to the inevitability of illicit conduct in the prison 
environment. Some prisoners will also use conditioning 
techniques to enable corrupt practices, befriending 
staff, attempting to form prohibited relationships with 
staff members to facilitate corruption, or use significant 
criminal reputation and intimidation, threat and coercion 
to shift staff into a position where they are de-facto 
enablers.
7.  Commodity and communication networks: The ease 
at which networks to convey messages to external 
accomplices and at which supply routes for goods can be 
established and maintained. Some prisoners involved in 
trafficking illicit and prohibited items may diversify items 
(iPad, USB devices, PS and illicit drugs, phones, alcohol 
and weapons) and may utilise several different supply 
means (corrupt staff, throw overs and recall prisoners) 
to limit chances of supply disruption by authorities. 
Additionally, prisoners serving with co-defendants, gang 
associates, affiliates and friends and in the locality of 
their own region may have greater access to immediate 
networks and may be better placed to be involved in 
trafficking, whereas in other regions and removed from 
familiar locality, those commodity and communication 
networks break down. (From Hopkins, et al, forthcoming).
In the Midlands region, there is already much to suggest a 
positive direction of travel, and staff overall, in all agencies, 
have articulated a steadfast resolve to attempt to limit 
opportunities for ongoing criminality in prison and for 
dealing with instances when they are detected through law 
enforcement and collaborative working. However, a realistic 
assessment is that initiatives, while developing, have been 
somewhat reactive and are yet to fully bed in. There are 
also a range of issues related to the legal framework that 
complicate matters when it comes to crime in prison. While 
prisons are secure environments which have some rules and 
restrictions that do not exist for those who are not confined, 
and limit their personal autonomy, at a general level, what 
is considered crime in the community is no different to that 
in prison, but this simplifies what is a complex system where 
different systems are in play. 
Cases that are sufficiently serious to attract the risk of the 
punishment of additional days in prison being added on to 
a prisoner’s sentence (up to 42 days at any one sitting) may 
be referred to a visiting district judge (known as an ‘external 
adjudicator’). The national ‘Handling Crime in Prison’ 
protocol suggests that in instances of serious misconduct, 
the processes are commenced together. However, for most 
cases it is the prison adjudication system that is used, and 
perhaps in some instances overused. 
Much of the discussion of Prison Law involves discipline 
in prison including several prison offences dealt with 
by the Prison Rules, which regulate the behaviour of 
those incarcerated in custodial settings. When a prisoner 
breaks the law in prison (be it the criminal law generally, 
or a specific prison offence), the prison commences a 
formal judicial and legal process against them. Normally 
infractions against the law in prison are dealt with by 
the internal process, which requires a charge to be ‘laid’ 
against the offending prisoner ‘as soon as possible and, 
save in exceptional circumstances, within 48 hours of 
the discovery of the offence’ when a prisoner is to be 
processed through the prison disciplinary process. This is a 
mandatory requirement and so a failure to promptly lay a 
charge may make any subsequent proceedings unlawful. 
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The unavailability of staff will not constitute ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ sufficient to justify a delay in laying the 
charge beyond 48 hours. Normally any offence in prison 
will be charged, although it is also possible that concurrently 
the matter will be reported to the police and dealt with 
under the formal auspices of the criminal law. If the charge 
is criminal and serious enough in nature, the governor must 
refer the matter to the police and then open and adjourn 
the hearing until the outcome of the police investigation 
and any subsequent prosecution is known. If a prosecution 
goes ahead, the adjudication will not proceed (since it would 
be double jeopardy for the prisoner to be punished – or 
acquitted – by a court, and then face a further adjudication 
punishment). If the prisoner is not prosecuted in a court 
the adjudication may then resume, provided the delay in 
reaching a decision on prosecution has not made it unfair  
to proceed (natural justice), or the adjudication would rely 
on the same evidence that was known to the CPS, which 
they had decided would not support a prosecution. 
In 2015, in their report ‘Punishment in Prison’, The Howard 
League for Penal Reform suggested that almost ‘160,000 
days – or 438 years – of additional imprisonment were 
imposed on prisoners found to have broken prison rules 
in 2014. The number of extra days imposed on children 
almost doubled in two years – from 1,383 in 2012 to 2,683 
in 2014 – even though the number of children in prison 
almost halved (Howard League, 2015). Following that, they 
produced ‘The rising tide: Additional days for rule-breaking 
in prison’ (Howard League, 2018) which suggested that:
A total of 359,081 days of additional imprisonment were 
imposed as punishment in 2017 across prisons in England 
and Wales – the equivalent of 983 additional years of 
imprisonment. This represents a rise of almost a quarter 
from 2016… Additional days have more than doubled over 
the past three years… Additional days are overwhelmingly 
imposed for non-violent infractions of rules… Prisons 
should operate in a way that reflects the highest standards 
of justice. The system of awarding additional days is 
variable and capricious, which undermines justice [and 
that] additional days contribute to a deteriorating prison 
system by exacerbating overcrowding and producing  
a sense of unfairness among prisoners. (Howard League, 
2018)
However, there are problems with such claims. The process 
is a complex one, but the giving of additional days is now 
controlled by independent adjudicator, and increased 
use and application may simply reflect the widespread 
problems with contraband and discipline currently being 
encountered in prisons. It is not clear, for example, how the 
claim that the majority are given for non-violent infraction 
of rules plays out, given that only the most serious of 
disciplinary infractions are referred to IA’s, it might be that 
such impositions are often for quite serious infractions (drug 
possession and mobile phone possession which are criminal 
offences that could in other circumstances potentially 
proceed through the criminal courts). 
Only a very small number of offences committed in prison 
result in outside prosecution, and recently, there have 
been several high-profile prosecutions, including the first 
successful prosecution of a prison drone smuggling group 
with prisoners based at HMP Hewell. However, there have 
also been several significant cases proceed to court to 
result in acquittals and collapsed trials, including a murder 
at HMP Pentonville. At the time of writing, a prison within 
the Midlands region (HMP Birmingham) was taken under 
State control due to a damning inspection report and the 
triggering of an Urgent Notification (UN) process. During the 
course of the inspection that triggered that concern, officers 
and prison inspectors’ cars were set on fire in a secure car 
park while prison staff were threatened with a firearm by 
masked men. Perhaps there can be no better illustration of 
the pressing need to understand how organised crime and 
prison intersect.
For example, The Howard League for Penal Reform report: 
‘Punishment in Prison: The world of prison discipline’ gives 
a good contextual overview of the application of prison 
discipline. Based on figures provided by Andrew Selous, 
then the Minister for Prisons, Probation, Rehabilitation and 
Sentencing, in an answer to written questions, it looks at 
the use and application of ‘adjudications’ – disciplinary 
hearings for contraventions of prison rules – which resulted 
in additional imprisonment of 160,000 days or 438 years in 
2014/15 (Howard League, 2015). The Howard League’s main 
findings are that:
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  The number of adjudications where extra days could be 
imposed has increased by 47 per cent since 2010.
  The rise in the number of adjudications has come at 
a time when prisons across England and Wales are 
struggling to overcome problems caused by a growing 
prisoner population, chronic overcrowding and cuts of 
almost 40 per cent to frontline staffing.
  Violence and self-injury in prisons are at their highest levels 
in a decade. In addition, there have been eight suspected 
homicides during 2015 – the highest number in a calendar 
year since current recording practices began in 1978.
  The hearings, which cost between an estimated 
£400,000 and £500,000 a year in total, mainly concern 
disobedience, disrespect or property offences.
Of course, the reality is that internal processes are dealing 
with a complex interplay of activities that are covered by 
internal disciplinary processes and at the lower end, some 
of these charges do not constitute crimes but acts of 
disobedience. However, bound up within this there are also 
serious assaults on staff and other prisoners, possession 
of drugs and mobile phones which are criminal offences, 
possession of drugs and an array of activities that arguably 
should be subject to sanction. 
In the case of allegations which are serious but are not 
referred to the police (or will not result in prosecution), an 
independent visiting district judge may be asked to conduct 
the adjudication. A district judge has additional powers to 
that of prison staff and prison governors and can impose up 
to a further 42 days’ imprisonment on top of the prisoner’s 
current sentence for each finding of guilt.
“What’s it like when people do something serious, you mean, what is the response like from the police?”
Interviewer: “Yes”.
“…well, I will be honest with you, it is a bit hit and miss. I would like to say that there is a parity, that crime in prison is taken 
seriously, but I will be honest with you, it is not. Prisoners are treated too leniently the sanctions that have been applied or 
are available to punish them are a joke. They often say: “And what are you going to do?” The answer to this has been not  
a lot or nothing and this has been imbedded in them. They assault you knowing that the likelihood is not a sentence,  
it goes to outside court and they get three months concurrent on a four-year sentence. Often the worst they might get  
is a maximum of 42 days on their sentence, that is a joke.” (Prison Officer)
A widespread and concerning view that we have 
encountered is that crime in prison was not regarded as 
significant or pressing, and that crime in prison was simply 
too readily tolerated by a detached management and 
criminal justice system that cared little. While the reality is 
arguably more complex, we have encountered numerous 
examples that would suggest that matters of crime in prison 
are largely not being given enough attention, and that this is 
damaging prison rehabilitation efforts, which ultimately will 
result in continuing problems in achieving a sufficient level  
of safety, security and discipline in prisons. 
Short-term action is required to get an ‘operational grip’ 
in prisons and put justice back into lawless jails, and 
there is an urgent need to get stability back into prisons, 
and particularly, into prisons with the highest levels of 
violence. At the time of writing, Prisons Minister Rory 
Stewart promised to be judged on his ability to reduce 
rates of violence in prison, and it is likely that recruitment of 
additional staff will yield some results in this respect, as will 
an increase in staff placed into some of the more disorderly 
prisons. However, longer-term, real success against 
organised crime will require not only numbers and boots 
on the landing, but better collaborative working, better 
dynamic security and risk assessment, and better proactive 
prevention. In addition, staff training needs an overhaul to 
equip them properly for the task of managing prisoners with 
diverse needs and characteristics, and to deal with emergent 
threats and the changing nature of crime. 
Given the nature of crime in prison at present we would 
aver that a significant investment of time and resource 
is necessary to tackle organised crime and drug use in 
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prison, but this pressing need must involve what we term 
an ‘IMPACT’ approach to crime in prison, with the IMPACT 
acronym based on the following sequential principles:
I – Intelligence sharing, gathering and analysis 
Effective criminal justice interventions are more likely when 
organisations work in partnership. At present, there are 
significant problems with ongoing criminality in prisons, and 
this should be regarded as everybody’s concern, and not 
just a prison-only problem. The first step to resolving the 
problems in our prisons is more effective law enforcement, 
and that requires collaborative and coordinated multi-
agency working. Arguably this is starting to happen, for 
example with a national protocol on ‘Handling Crime in 
Prison’, but there is too little evidence of this collaborative 
working happening in a coordinated manner other than 
on an ad hoc basis and often is not sufficiently supported 
from on high. Yet we have seen the benefits that arise when 
police, prisons and CPS work in a coordinated manner 
to share intelligence regarding OCG/lifetime offenders 
and developments in the community. Prisons to gather 
situational intelligence (e.g. who they affiliate with) that is 
useful for the police, and the police provide vital support for 
prisons, but often these practices form organically, and they 
should be better managed and supported from on high. 
Prison safety and security teams should work jointly and 
recognise the link between intelligence gathered regarding 
those who are at risk of harm to themselves, and intelligence 
gathered about those who are at risk of harm to others/the 
security of the establishment. Joint intelligence meetings 
should take place on a regular basis, proportionate to the 
level of threat (e.g. monthly or quarterly).
M – Monitoring, supervision and surveillance 
Arguably organised crime has moved into a void in prison 
that has been left by the out flux of experienced staff, and 
takes root when monitoring, supervision and surveillance 
in prison is insufficient. However, it is arguable that prisons 
should not be regarded as the sole responsibility of the 
prison service and given the significant benefits that can be 
yielded by intelligence sharing and proactive investigation, 
there should be a bigger role for the police in prison. 
P – Proactive, preventative and partnership approach
Within and beyond the prison, the core objective should 
be to incorporate the four Ps approach (Pursue, Prevent, 
Protect and Prepare), but where ‘prevention’ should be 
regarded as primary. Better intelligence and a proactive 
stemming of drugs and mobile phones into prison will yield 
significant results. The Government has moved some way 
to use technology to address problems, but technology 
alone is unlikely to be enough. A proactive (intelligence-led) 
approach that seeks to prevent crime is clearly preferable to 
dealing with the consequences when it arises.
A – Act to mitigate risk and reduce opportunity/demand
Ultimately, the prison becomes a place where drug markets 
thrive at least in part when there are other problems at 
play, and it is notable that organised crime has become 
more prevalent in custody at precisely the time that the 
Government have implemented significant cuts to MoJ and 
Prison budgets. Prisons should not be places where drug 
use and inactivity are promoted but should be places of 
rehabilitation that challenge pro-criminal attitudes and risk 
factors that act as criminogenic drivers when prisoners are 
released into the community. Prisons should have active 
regimes, effective staff supervision of prisoners, cultivate 
effective staff/prisoner relationships and should be places 
with a clean and decent environment and purposeful activity. 
C – Charge and convict
When prisoners in prison break the law, they need to 
recognise that there is a consequence, and that there are 
consequences for their behaviour. At present, crime in prison 
is not regarded as on par with that in the community, and 
there is a complacency that while in prison crime is less 
pressing and important, and this should not be the case. This 
contributes to a sense of lawlessness in prison, and organised 
crime thrives on this general sense and when there is a lack 
of accountability (for staff and men/women in custody). 
a.  There is a selective response to wrongdoing – 
discriminatory 
b.  Harmful behaviour and misconduct occur with impunity 
(harm is excused, justified or ignored) – desensitisation 
c.  The available informal mechanisms are not used 
appropriately (IEP, informal dialogue, appropriate referral 
to relevant services/agencies)
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Authority is inappropriately ‘pushed up’ (to CM/Adjudicating 
Governor/GG) or ‘pushed out’ (to the IA, police, courts) 
– distant, delayed or dismissed. The inappropriate use of 
the available mechanisms, and failure to apply the law is 
counterproductive. If proceedings against those who are 
disrupting the regime becomes the norm, or if offences 
are dismissed or pass without sanction, staff moral suffers 
and further decline in standards in custody is likely. Some 
officers will question the integrity and utility of the process 
and decide there is no point in using these processes in the 
future, prisoners are empowered to step into the void that 
staff leave, and crime thrives. Instead prison staff need to 
wield proportionate, legitimate authority, a fact that is long 
recognised as:
At the end of the day, relations between staff and prisoners 
are at the heart of the whole prison system and that 
control and security flow from getting that relationship 
right. Prisons cannot be run by coercion; they depend 
on staff having a firm, confident and humane approach 
that enables them to maintain close contact with inmates 
without abrasive confrontation. (Home Office, 1984: 6)
When prisoners break the law in a serious manner, they 
should be under no illusion that they will face criminal 
sanctions as they would if such behaviour was detected 
outside. This also requires the police to regard crime 
committed in prison as equally serious to that occurring in 
the community, and not see prisons as simply places that 
give the public respite from criminality. It is in everyone’s 
interest to see that offenders who continue criminality 
in custody will face sanction. This is the very principle of 
the national Handling Crime in Prison protocol, which 
seeks to see that acts of criminality within prisons are 
properly addressed where the prison determines that the 
internal discipline process is insufficient, and that criminal 
prosecution is appropriate. Where there is serious ongoing 
criminality in prison it is in every agency’s interest to work 
collaboratively and purposefully to charge and convict. 
However, it is better that crime in prison is prevented in  
the first instance.
T – Tactical and strategic responses across the prison 
estate 
When serious criminality occurs in prison, charges are levied, 
and prisoners are convicted, it is an opportunity to look 
at whether prison is providing effective incapacitation. In 
some cases, transfer within the establishment or across the 
prison estate (and into higher security) may be appropriate. 
However, transfer is not always a means to an end as some 
more entrepreneurial or well-affiliated individuals may be 
able to maintain or broaden their networks. Additionally, 
moving prisoners can impact on police work. Again, the 
best approach will be a coordinated, considered and 
collaborative one, where again the core aim is prevention 
of future criminality. Coordinated work need not stop at 
conviction, but rather might involve, for example, using 
tools such as Civil Gang Injunctions, lifetime offender 
management processes and mechanisms such as Serious 
Crime Prevention Orders (SCPOs) and the use of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) to recover criminal assets. 
However, that tactical and strategic response may not need 
to be predicated in the first instance on such lofty aims.  
We have been concerned at the number of criminal 
instances that could not be pursued because prisons 
had failed to collect evidence carefully or deliver 
necessary material to the police in a timely manner. Better 
collaborative working could have the advantage of leading 
police to aid prisons in better preservation of evidence and 
better investigation and information sharing that mitigates 
against such future risks, and as an aid to increase prisoner 
perceptions that the risk of ongoing involvement in crime 
in prison outweighs reward. Violence and drug dealing in 
prison should be met with even greater intolerance than 
similar offences in the community and doing so is ultimately 
in everyone’s interest. 
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The issues of ongoing criminality in prisons are complex, 
and crime occurs in prison for several reasons. Not all 
the crime that occurs in prison is easily foreseeable and 
preventable, especially as prisons hold people who can 
be difficult, disturbed and chaotic. The Government’s 
new approach to improve standards and security will be 
piloted in ten of the most challenging prisons. It will seek 
to focus on reducing violence through radically increasing 
security against drugs and challenging all abusive behaviour, 
investment in leadership and dedicated resources to tackle 
drugs, security and building issues. The ambition to see 
good practice spread across the prison estate is a laudable 
one, yet the challenge ahead is significant. 
At present the Government is taking a laudable approach 
to attempt to embed greater safety and security in ten 
selected Pathfinder prisons which have, like other Category 
B and C establishments, struggled with acute problems, 
including high drug use, violence and issues created by the 
physical built environment. While the staff at the chosen 
establishments (Hull, Humber, Leeds, Lindholme, Moorland, 
Wealstun, Nottingham, Ranby, Isis and Wormwood Scrubs) 
have been provided with additional resources and support 
to make decisive, lasting progress (and tangible results are 
expected within the next 12 months) other establishments 
face many of the same problems. Adequate staffing is clearly 
a key aspect in building safe and secure prisons, but staffing 
alone is not the only element. A focus on prevention of drug 
use and violence is a good one, but that focus needs to be 
broad and not simply reactive. It is worth stating here that 
some of the challenges with the rise of New Psychoactive 
Substances and the challenges they presented for the prison 
estate were arguably foreseeable, as were the challenges 
that mobile phones present. A more holistic and future-
threat focused strategy should arguably be part of dealing 
with crime in prisons, and some changes are more likely 
with an even more significant shift in national policy. 
National Policy
No amount of preventative security will necessarily stem the 
flow of contraband into prisons. Mechanisms can reduce it, 
such as body scanning, targeting with intelligence and better 
searching. However, it seems that there is broad agreement 
amongst many stakeholders that prisons need either 
significantly more staff, or significantly fewer prisoners,  
or perhaps at best, a combination of both. 
A recurrent suggestion for limiting prisoner numbers has 
been the reduction in use of short sentence prisoners, and 
for the most part this would seem a sensible aim. That is not 
to deny that sometimes custodial sentences are the only 
option available to give communities a rest from prolific 
offenders who wreak havoc. We often lose sight of the fact 
that short-term custody, when the conditions are right, can 
provide a place of safety and structure for chaotic offenders 
to address their problems and access services, but what 
is currently on offer for short sentence prisoners is simply 
not good enough, and that is clearly impacting on one 
major supply route of drugs into prisons. Some short-term 
prisoners are clearly using the new short recall process, in 
some cases just for days, to convey drugs into prison, and 
even though better dynamic security might ebb this flow 
somewhat, the problem likely requires a better policy-led 
solution. 
We are now a decade on from the Government Green Paper 
‘Breaking the cycle: Effective punishment, rehabilitation 
and sentencing of offenders’ which suggested the need 
for ‘greater use of strenuous, unpaid work as part of a 
community sentence alongside tagging and curfews, 
delivered swiftly after sentencing. When fines are a sensible 
sentence, we will place a greater focus on enforcement 
and collection. We will put a much stronger emphasis on 
compensation for victims of crime’ (MoJ, 2010: 1). Clearly 
this has not happened, and instead, prisons have had to 
take greater numbers. Furthermore, the diversion of more 
of the less serious offenders with mental illness and drug 
dependency into treatment rather than prison has not 
happened sufficiently and cheap, ineffective short-term 
custody remains overused and is still woefully inefficient  
and unproductive. 
11   Recommendations
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A focus on preventative security that seeks to stop illicit 
drugs entering prison may take us so far, but ultimately a 
regular demand means that drugs will likely continue to 
enter prisons via the means of conveyance often involving 
‘plugging’. Certainly signal-detecting equipment and poles 
and boss chairs give an edge back to the regime, increasing 
the chances of detection, but that does not mean items 
will not enter prisons. Prisoners identified as holding and 
secreting can be re-diverted to different establishments, but 
this can cause unforeseen violence, drugs can be stolen in 
violent episodes by other prisoners, and even segregated 
prisoners have novel ways of ensuring contraband can 
bypass staff and make its way onto the wings. Inmates 
can use ‘lines’ – makeshift ropes of shoelaces or torn-up 
sheets – to pass supplies between cell windows or via toilet 
systems when they’re locked in cells, and other trusted 
prisoners may pass items. Even detecting smuggling and 
conveyers does not mean that illicit items do not enter 
the establishment. Rather than security alone, positive 
productive and engaging regimes, good drug treatment 
and a focus on education, harm reduction and demand 
reduction might be useful, especially as the Home Office 
have suggested that just under a third of those interviewed 
in English prisons ‘stated that the expense of buying drugs in 
prison resulted in debt or being short of things (particularly 
tobacco, canteen and toiletries)’ and 60 per cent of those 
surveyed perceived that the prison drugs trade was the 
major cause of violence in prisons (Penfold et al, 2005).
National policy could be extremely significant in closing 
down some supply routes, for example, given what we have 
been told by prisoners during the course of the research  
it would seem that a review of procedures under ‘Rule 39’, 
to ensure confidential privileged legal correspondence is not 
being abused for the purposes of drug conveyance would 
be useful as a national measure, as would better national 
coordinated action on proactive investigation of suspected 
corrupt staff and better resourcing of anti-corruption work 
more broadly. Not all the solutions lie in prosecution and 
proactive security, and hence nationally a review of the 
prison disciplinary system that has developed in a partly 
piecemeal manner is perhaps long overdue. 
Crime in prisons will sometimes need to be formally 
prosecuted, but taking some prison-based criminal offences 
through the courts is expensive and resource intensive, 
and there are other systems of redress available to prisons 
that can be used against those who offend as a form of 
immediate sanction. It is an oft-cited maxim in criminal 
justice terms that: people obey the law if they believe it’s 
legitimate, not because they fear punishment. Hence it 
is not the severity of sanctions but rather the certainty of 
action that may be most important. Prisoners are already 
induced to follow rules under the ‘Incentives and Earned 
Privileges Scheme’, and the punishments that can be made 
under it such as removal of away privileges – e.g. removing 
a TV from a cell and added days are potentially quite 
effective sanctions if properly used in a consistent manner, 
especially for the lower level infractions. However, it does 
not address underpinning features such as education, skills, 
substance misuse services, the things that ensure prisoners 
have the support they need to stop using drugs and turn 
their backs on crime for good, or prisoners’ transition from 
custody to community and access to drug and alcohol 
treatment, accommodation, financial advice and family 
engagement. Given the involvement of short-term prisoners 
on fixed recalls in supplying drugs to meet prison demand, it 
would seem investment in just such measures are extremely 
necessary. 
The estimated costs of police action alone on a charge of a 
prisoner being in possession of a mobile phone is significant 
and varies dependent upon whether an offender pleads 
guilty or not. It was suggested during research that a Guilty 
plea to that charge is about £300 to police, in the case of 
a Not Guilty plea, Police Investigation, attribution, forensic 
analysis, review of data and file prep results in a cost-per-
case of around £750. We heard that if a phone possession 
case is committed for sentence to the Crown Court, then 
the amount of costs the defendant would be ordered to pay 
is £425. If he or she challenges the case a trial in the Crown 
Court can cost £3,500. However, the full cost of such action 
is bolstered by the cost of transporting a prisoner to court, 
administration at the prison, the escorts needed and the van 
drivers and the cells staff in the court cells will be significant, 
as would be the high costs of CPS staff involvement, as 
well as the prison cost of any additional time added to the 
offenders’ sentence. It is not that the high cost of action 
should simply be considered a barrier to prosecution, but 
rather, prosecution needs to be strategic and purposeful 
rather than ad hoc. 
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Only very few cases of mobile phone possession in prison 
come to court. The costs of such action may well outweigh 
any wider benefit on many occasions, especially if the 
result is simply a sentence that is no greater than the 42 
additional days that can be given under the prison discipline 
system. However, with the core role that most organisations, 
including the NCA, see phones playing in ongoing crime, it 
may be that wider roll out of blocking technology is needed 
as national policy. Ultimately, it is a core contention that 
better gathering of data would be useful in trying to build a 
more accurate and comprehensive picture of the character 
and nature of crime in prison. 
Appeals for preventative and reactive security has framed 
much of the debate about crime and drugs in prison, 
but the reality is that drugs will always enter prison, and 
it is likely that security measures that seek to prevent 
importation will only lead the criminal ‘Business Men’ at 
the top of the hierarchy to seek other methods of ingress. 
That said, at present, the prison drug market is high profit, 
low risk, and we need to move to a situation where it is low 
demand, low profit and high risk. While it is often popular to 
demand more and better searching from prison staff, one 
dimensional and single agency responses often fail to see 
the bigger picture. The reality is likely that a coordinated 
approach is needed across the entire prison estate, but 
such interventions should also be informed by a better 
understanding of the nature and specifics of the challenges 
facing prisons and preventative interventions that are more 
likely to yield long-term successes. 
Local Initiatives and Local 
Recommendations
There are clear problems with violence and drug 
use in prisons and much of the current instability is 
disproportionately encountered in category B and C 
establishments. Clearly removing problematic individuals 
can disrupt supply routes and, just like any organisation, a 
lack of leadership and coordination amongst criminal groups 
can stop them from being involved in business. However, 
as there are diverse routes for drugs to enter custody, and 
as the profits and demand are unlikely to decline, there will 
likely be continual demand and challenges.  
Both a preventative approach, and one that ultimately 
removes the financial incentives and rewards at the other 
end is likely to be the best approach, as is a wide focus on 
market reduction and market demand in prisons. 
We still have an absence of good empirical data that allows 
us to understand the issues and challenges, and it would 
be useful to see greater coordination of data gathering and 
analysis around vulnerabilities in prison collected and made 
available. However, given what we know thus far, it seems 
that the following issues are worthy of consideration. 
1.  Continuing to monitor and ensure compliance with 
the national ‘Handling Crime in Prison’ protocol, which 
aims to ensure that acts of criminality within prisons are 
properly addressed where the prison determines that 
the internal discipline process is insufficient and where 
the circumstances indicate that criminal prosecution is 
appropriate. 
2.  The small subset of ‘Business Men’ offenders invested 
in organised crime exist within the prison population 
and this group. While largely complaint in prison, they 
present a particular and enduring risk both to those in 
prison and in the community. They need to be targeted 
and effectively managed through interventions, and 
particularly financial investigation.
While crime in prison is notionally important, various 
groups including police, prison and CPS have slightly 
different, yet often shared priorities and a key aspect of 
taking a stance against crime in prisons is collaboration, 
clear communication and strong multi-agency working. 
Throughout the research process we encountered 
professionals keen to do a good job, but almost all 
organisations recognised that there can be difficulty in 
communicating their organisational priorities, needs 
and constraints and processes with others. That said, 
the majority of those we spoke to were positive about 
the current direction of travel and were keen to see 
collaboration and collegiality continue. All agencies 
recognised that crime in prison is both a problem, and a 
problem for everyone, and were keen to tackle it. That said, 
better opportunities for that and from cross-organisational 
learning could be grasped for example if some more 
formalised arrangements existed. 
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3.  Establish a forum that facilitates multi-agency working 
between various stakeholders which seeks to tackle the 
most serious incidences of crime in prison and where 
best practice and knowledge exchange and transfer can 
take place 
4.  Develop an ‘IMPACT’ geared multi-agency approach to 
serious crime in prison-based on emerging knowledge 
and use a coordinated approach for investigation and 
prosecution of the most serious organised crime in 
prisons; focusing on both corrupt staff and the minority 
of ‘Business Men’ figures at the top of the criminal and 
prison hierarchy. Multi-agency working between police, 
prisons and other agencies to target the ‘untouchable’ 
prisoners most benefiting from the illicit trade. 
5.  Use this forum to facilitate better information sharing 
between ROCU, police, prisons and other organisations 
(particularly CPS) to build prosecutions and effectively 
target the prison crime most closely linked to the prison 
drug trade.
6.  Underpin this with an aim to better use and employ both 
financial investigation and ultimately asset confiscation 
powers to ensure that the prison drug trade is not 
profitable for untouchable prisoners and use successful 
results to provide an element of disincentive.
7.  Ensure local corruption prevention is properly 
coordinated and resourced with proactive intelligence-
led investigation when required.
8.  Use local pilots and multi-agency working to consider 
specific vulnerabilities and inform interventions.
That ‘prevention is better than cure’ is a long-established 
maxim, but essentially the multi-faceted nature of ongoing 
crime in prison requires such a recognition. Staff in prison 
clearly work in difficult environments, but they can be better 
supported to more proactive law enforcement function. 
At the moment that is true at all levels, for example prison 
staff were not well aware of the mechanisms and functions 
that could support them as staff, for example when it came 
to giving witness statements and gathering evidence (and 
it would seem that at present, there is something of an 
omission in prison staff training around evidence gathering 
and legal processes) through to the mechanisms available to 
protect them and others if called to give evidence in criminal 
matters. Another sign of the crisis engulfing the prison 
service are the official figures that show it has lost 6,000 
years of officer experience in the last year alone, and this 
clearly has an impact when it comes to specialist knowledge 
for investigation of serious offences in prison. Better training 
of prison staff in dealing with the most serious matters of 
crime in prison might seemingly be of benefit here. 
A point worth making perhaps is that while every prison 
officer is empowered as a constable and has some law 
enforcement function, it is arguable that staff need better 
guidance on how, when and where matters should be 
regarded as prison matters and where they should be 
regarded as meeting the threshold for external action. 
However, the prison service as an organisation is arguably 
not equipped or resourced to deal with some of the most 
serious instances of crime in prison and may require more 
specialist support in this regard. 
Certainly it would seem that the Prison Service may not be 
the best organisation to work at the forefront of tackling 
the most serious manifestations of violence and organised 
crime in prison, and that function is better regarded as 
the function of the police, who have more experience of 
intelligence-led targeting of organised crime groups and 
core figures involved in ongoing criminality and could 
provide this function much more purposefully in prisons. 
There is potential for a greater role for police in some 
aspects of prisons that have traditionally been regarded 
the sole preserve of prison security staff. That is equally 
true of financial investigation where the police for example 
are incentivised in a way that the prison service are not to 
undertake financial investigation and use Proceeds of Crime 
Act (POCA) powers, including against those prisoners that 
have sometimes been regarded by some prison staff as ‘no 
problem’, essentially the ‘Business Men’ figures outlined 
previously who are largely compliant when incarcerated. 
Understandably a key step on the path to better dealing with 
crime in prison is that the problem needs not be regarded 
as a problem for the criminal justice system more broadly, 
and not a prison problem per se. Some of the ‘Business Men’ 
figures continue to exert a malign influence on communities 
even when incarcerated, and do not cease to be a problem 
merely due to their incarceration.  
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Their harmful behaviour has a ripple effect that makes waves 
in communities. Those harms are arguably ones that are 
best dealt with using a coordinated multi-agency approach. 
Many of the pressures that prisons face is driven by wider 
socio-economic, cultural and technological changes over 
which they have little control, and which have impacts in 
the community and in prison. It can be easy to see prison 
as the end of the criminal justice process, and prisoners as 
effectively ‘incapacitated’ and prevented from crime. This 
simply no longer stands true. While there is much that prison 
staff can do day-to-day to attempt to create crime-free 
environments and settings that are not conducive to pro-
criminal behaviours, ongoing crime in prisons needs to be 
regarded as ‘everybody’s problem’. Now many in the police 
seem to suggest that there would be much more that they 
could do with appropriate resourcing, but single full-time 
police liaison officers can only do so much and tend to be in 
demand and the reactive nature of the task and the volume 
of offences that they deal with mean that they are already 
often too much in demand. Many of those in this role that 
we spoke to were keen to suggest that they would like to 
be more proactive in their work and how they could see 
that this ultimately could be beneficial, especially if their 
core function was to deal with the most serious offences. 
Ultimately, the real lesson we need to learn is not to see 
crime in the community and crime in prison as necessarily 
separate, especially when it comes to serious organised 
crime, because often they are symbiotic. 
This leads us to highlight how prison crime is policed and 
investigated, which has received very little attention, but 
it might well be time to revisit that. As part of action to 
enhance safety, security and decency across the prison 
estate, the Ministry of Justice has committed to creating 
a new digital tool that will enable prisons to build a more 
detailed picture of the kind of risk a prisoner is likely to 
present – including the likelihood of involvement in 
organised crime. 
At a national level plans are afoot to roll out this new 
digital tool (which assesses information from various law 
enforcement databases to create a central ‘risk rating’ for 
each prisoner) making it available across the entire country 
over the next year, at a cost of around £1 million. While 
better information sharing, and technological fixes can go 
so far, we should not lose sight of the need for proactive 
investigation and boots on the ground, and recognise  
that it is very often people who are effective in both  
crime prevention and prosecution, and so much of  
that effectiveness is people working together toward  
a common goal. 
Local knowledge is important, and prison-based police 
liaison officers are involved in a unique role in the criminal 
justice system, just as prison officers can come to possess 
a great deal of very useful and actionable intelligence that 
can aid criminal investigations. The CPS want to secure 
convictions and see offenders face sanctions, and CRCs and 
probation staff work hard to try and ensure public safety 
and see offenders given opportunities to more away from 
criminality. Behind that an array of stakeholders have an 
interest in preventing future victims, and we know that the 
best crime prevention and reduction initiatives tend to be 
well planned, monitored, managed and holistic. Ultimately, 
reducing crime in prison, like reducing crime in the 
community requires a whole system approach.
When a prison feels unsafe, or levels of violence and bullying 
are high, the tendency can be to increase and rely on 
‘hard’ forms of security and control. However, ‘ratcheting 
up’ security measures are a largely ineffective long-term 
strategy to creating safe custody where rehabilitation can 
happen.  
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Whilst it may well temporarily reduce opportunities for 
violence and criminality, it is likely to increase feelings of 
frustration, exacerbate the perceived ‘pains of imprisonment’ 
(Sykes, 1958), sharpen the divide between staff and 
prisoners (Wortley, 2002) and ultimately prove counter-
productive. Thus, security measures and decisions need to 
be proportional, achieving the appropriate balance between 
safety, security and decency. This too is true of crime, where 
the response of authorities needs to be proportionate. The 
focus on protective security is a good and useful one that 
can drive down the influx of drugs into prison, but it will 
likely create demands for investigation and prosecution 
that will also require investment, and this needs to be 
remembered. Financial criminal investigation, for example, 
that probe how bank accounts are being used to pay for 
drugs in prison and track down the criminals linked to them 
is necessary to reduce the longer-term gains from criminals 
supplying drugs into prisons.  
Effective work that seeks to peruse, prevent, protect and 
prepare requires coordination, management and oversight 
as effective multi-agency working needs to be strategic and 
coordinated. Many of the initiatives initiated at a national 
level seem well directed, but effective delivery will ultimately 
require coordinated strategy and oversight. At a local level 
there is the possibility and will to do this, and ultimately that 
can likely result in safer prisons, and safer communities. 
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Crime does not stop at the prison gate house, and 
incarceration alone is not a barrier to ongoing criminal 
activity which further harms victims and communities, both 
in the confines of the prison and beyond. However, with 
better understanding of what crime in custody looks like, 
and concerted action to act to minimise it, it is possible to 
reduce the risk. Identification of the signs and symptoms 
of perpetration and victimisation in prison and taking 
appropriate action to respond to these in an intelligence 
informed strategic fashion will help to achieve this.
Prison can work and can be rehabilitative, but without safety, 
security and decency as a solid foundation, no prison can 
be safe and rehabilitative. Preventative security is useful, but 
ultimately it is important that we realise at the current time it 
is unlikely that the flow of drugs into prison can be stemmed 
just by better searching and the prosecution of a few 
individuals conveying them in, or holding mobile phones for 
others will drive down a prison-based demand for drugs or 
the violence that is used on occasion to regulate this market. 
Different prisons will have different crime problems, but 
ultimately some crime in prisons, and in particular, high level 
organised crime is now both significant and pressing, and it 
can no longer be ignored. It is not a conspiracy of detached 
policy makers or a false conspiracy exaggerated by 
invested parties, but a very real problem that is undermining 
rehabilitative efforts, and benefits only a minority of criminals 
and corrupt staff. In contrast, most staff and prisoners face 
the negative consequences of it which are manifest in 
increasingly unsafe, unstable and insecure regimes. This 
need addressing urgently. 
Reducing the frequency and prevalence of crime in prison, 
as well as the persistence with which some perpetrators can 
profit and harm others, requires a whole prison approach. 
There is no ‘magic bullet’ or single solution that will address 
the problem, but crime in prison should not, and must never 
be considered an inevitable feature of the prison landscape. 
Prison crime and victimisation does not occur in isolation 
or a vacuum, and both the causes and the responses 
required to address it are complex and multi-faceted. Crime 
in prison is a problem for criminal justice more broadly, 
but that problem is solvable with a coordinated whole 
system approach, multi-agency working, and strategic 
and managerial oversight aimed at producing tangible 
results. Crime in prison, and particularly organised crime is 
detectable and prosecutable if there is a will from the police, 
prison service and other agencies within criminal justice to 
work to challenge it. There has never been a more pressing 
need to take that action. 
12   Conclusion
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